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COMMENT 
The New Wild West: Exploring Western New 
York’s Underground, Fraudulent Debt 
Collection Industry 
NATHAN WOODARD† 
INTRODUCTION 
It starts with a phone call. You, or worse yet, a friend, 
family member, or an ex-spouse, receive a call from an 
“attorney.” This “attorney” informs you that a creditor 
retained his firm to settle a debt that you allegedly owe. You 
are told that a “[two]-part felony complaint” will issue for 
your arrest; law enforcement will arrive within the hour to 
pick you up on these charges.1 This “attorney” then asks you 
to secure any firearms or dogs—for the officers’ safety—and 
to arrange for supervision of any minor children.2 You 
request verification of this debt, but you are told that their 
 
†J.D. Candidate, 2018, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.A. Economics & 
Political Science, 2013, SUNY Cortland. Note & Comment Editor, Buffalo Law 
Review; Legal Intern, New York State Office of the Attorney General. I sincerely 
appreciate the efforts of everyone who made this publication possible. First and 
foremost, I want to thank the members of the Buffalo Law Review for all of their 
hard work and commitment to the Journal. Also, a special thanks to Senior 
Consumer Fraud Representative, Karen Davis, and Assistant Attorney General, 
James Morrissey, for their assistance with this publication and for their 
dedicated service to the people of New York. 
 1. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No 
Genuine Issue to Be Tried at 39, FTC v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-
6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Pls. 
SoMF]; Phil Fairbanks, Abusive Debt Collector Gets 78 Months in Federal Prison, 
BUFF. NEWS (June 1, 2017), http://buffalonews.com/2017/05/31/abusive-debt-
collector-gets-78-months-prison/. 
 2. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 39. 
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agency already sent you multiple notices to which you failed 
to respond, and the “attorney’s” firm cannot stay your arrest 
any longer. Next, you are told that the only way for you to 
avoid arrest is to obtain a court release number, which you 
will receive only upon proof of payment. You panic. You do 
not have any outstanding debt nor do you recall any prior 
dealings with the supposed creditor, but this “attorney” 
knows your address, your relatives, and even your social 
security number. 
You do not have the money but do not want to go to jail, 
so you scrape together all the money you can and borrow the 
rest. You call back, say you have the money, and ask how to 
pay. The “attorney” then informs you that his office only 
handles the “legal paperwork” and directs you to call the 
firm’s payment processor at another number. Only then do 
you learn that, due to your financial history, they will only 
accept wire-transfers or money orders. You make the 
payment as directed and call the “attorney” back to obtain 
your “court release number.” Wishing this nightmare would 
end, you call the court and give the clerk your release 
number. The clerk, however, has no idea what you are 
talking about—your “court release number” is meaningless 
to them. Only now, once the panic of imminent arrest 
subsided, do you realize that you have been scammed. There 
is no “attorney”—the caller was merely a rogue debt collector 
engaged in an elaborate, fraudulent scheme designed to prey 
on your fear.3 
While American consumers fall victim to these devious 
debt collection practices every day, debt collection is the 
 
 3. See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against Vantage Point Services, LLC, 
et al., FTC v. Vantage Point Servs, LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Pls. MSJ] (alleging abusive, 
deceptive, and fraudulent tactics one debt collection operation employed to collect 
on consumer debt). See also Vantage Point Servs., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111084, at *2. 
2018] WILD WEST OF DEBT COLLECTION 241 
largest industry in Western New York (WNY).4 Debt 
collection ranks number one among consumer complaints 
reported to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each year 
by a wide margin.5 In 2016, the FTC received more debt 
collection complaints than the next two complaint 
categories—imposter scams and identity theft—combined.6 
Yet, in WNY, business is booming. Nearly five thousand 
people are employed in the industry in WNY.7 The appeal is 
obvious: for a minimal capital investment, anyone can open 
their own collection agency yielding massive returns.8 In 
these small, unregulated collection agencies, unlawful and 
 
 4. The Bureau of Labor Statistics map and corresponding table titled 
“[m]etropolitan areas with the highest concentration of jobs and location 
quotients in this occupation” shows Buffalo, NY, among metropolitan areas with 
the highest concentration of debt collections and the most aggregate jobs of all 
metropolitan areas listed therein. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS, OCCUPATIONAL 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, MAY 2016: 43-3011 BILL AND ACCOUNT COLLECTORS,  
(2017), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes433011.htm. See also Fred O. 
Williams, Buffalo Collection Firms Are Part of an Industry Than Too Often Uses 
Threats and Lies to Collect Millions in Unpaid Bills, BUFF. NEWS, July 23, 2006, 
at A1, A8, http://www.kiplingerprogram.org/kiplinger/projects_art/
fred%20williams.pdf. 
 5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR 
JANUARY–DECEMBER 2016 6, 79 (2017) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december-
2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book.pdf [hereinafter FTC SENTINEL DATABASE] 
(accounting for 28% of all consumer complaints received by the FTC in 2016). 
 6. Id. 
 7. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., supra note 4; Phil Fairbanks, Buffalo Becomes 
‘Ground Zero’ for Abusive Debt Collectors, BUFF. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2017), 
http://buffalonews.com/2017/08/05/abusive-debt-collectors-find-home-buffalo/. 
But see Interview with Karen Davis, Senior Consumer Fraud Representative, 
New York State Attorney General’s Office: Bureau of Consumer Fraud & 
Protection, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Davis Interview] (alleging 
that this number could be much higher because debt collectors frequently do not 
report income or employment; she estimates that the actual number is likely 
closer to 10,000). 
 8. Federal prosecutors obtained an audio recording of one collection agency 
owner stating that it “did 370 grand [in] the month of March. We’re on a $300,000 
a month pace right now.” Rick Pfeiffer, Feds Take Down Local Debt Collection 
Operation, NIAGARA GAZETTE (June 28, 2017), http://www.niagara-
gazette.com/news/local_news/feds-take-down-local-debt-collection-
operation/article_af640bcc-cc91-51ba-a256-44e8f07ec9d4.html. 
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devious practices are commonplace. 
Part I of this Comment provides a historical background 
of debtor-creditor relations in the United States and context 
explaining why society, in general, views debtors 
unsympathetically. It then explains the debt collection 
industry’s rapid, but isolated, development in WNY. Part II 
outlines the collection scheme’s development, which is 
designed to avoid detection. In this light, Part III outlines the 
rampant criminal conduct customary among WNY collectors. 
Here, the most egregious practices are discussed 
individually. Part IV begins by discussing how such 
pervasive illegality grew unfettered in the region before 
addressing the particular barriers hindering law 
enforcement from stopping these illegal practices. Part IV 
also addresses law enforcement’s current response to these 
illegal practices and the need for further remedial measures. 
This Comment concludes with proposed solutions to reduce 
the hindrances encumbering law enforcement, and details 
how they could pave the way towards taming the new “Wild 
West.” 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND & CONTEXT 
In the United States legal system, creditors have 
historically enjoyed vastly more favorable treatment than 
debtors. The development of bankruptcy law and the 
treatment debtors received throughout American history 
illustrates creditors’ expansive remedies to recover debts, 
demonstrates residual, popular aversion to indebtedness, 
and the social rebuke that debtors commonly encounter.9  
Early American bankruptcy laws virtually copied those 
 
 9. Press Release, N.Y. Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General 
Cuomo Sues to Shut Down Buffalo-based Debt Collection Operation That 
Illegally Harassed and Threatened Consumers Nationwide (Aug. 18, 2009), 
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-sues-shut-down-buffalo-
based-debt-collection-operation [hereinafter Cuomo Press Release] (“Collectors 
routinely called consumers ‘drunks,’ ‘scumbags,’ ‘deadbeats,’ and, in one instance, 
‘a low-life piece of trash.”). 
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conceived in England, which treated debtors quasi-
criminally.10 These laws did not provide protection for 
debtors, but rather protected creditors from debtors.11 
Common law writs of fieri facias, elegit, and levari facias 
provided creditors with powerful measures to recover 
outstanding debts.12 A writ of fieri facias authorized the 
judicial seizure and sale of a debtor’s chattels;13 elegit forced 
an appraisal of the debtor’s goods and chattels;14 and levari 
facias authorized judicial seizure and sale of the produce of 
a debtor’s land.15 Strikingly, in early England, under certain 
circumstances, the law authorized executing debtors who 
committed fraudulent acts.16 
While debtors received unsympathetic treatment in 
early England, they did not fare much better across the pond. 
In a recent New York collection action, Southern 
Chautauqua County Federal Credit Union v. Moore,17 Judge 
Sedita offered a historical overview of imprisonment for 
nonpayment of private debts in the United States. He stated: 
Deprivation of one’s liberty for nonpayment of a debt was a normal 
feature of American commercial life from the colonial era into the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Imprisonment for indebted-
ness was commonplace with at least two signatories of the Declara-
tion of Independence . . . spending time in jail after neglecting 
loans.18 
 
 10. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 6–14 (1995). 
 11. Pfeiffer, supra note 8, at 7. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Fieri facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 14. Elegit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 15. Levari facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 16. Tabb, supra note 10, at 11. 
 17. 39 N.Y.S.3d 360, 361 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (analyzing whether an arrest 
warrant for contempt should issue for nonpayment of a private debt). 
 18. Id. at 361 (providing a historical analysis of imprisonment arising out of 
debtor-creditor relations). 
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Subjected to contemporary analysis, the notion of 
debtors’ prisons contravenes modern senses of equity; yet, at 
that time, debtors who defaulted received worse treatment 
than incarcerated criminals.19 Amazingly, “[d]ebtor size-
prisoners were responsible for providing their own food and 
clothing, which many could not do while non-debtor 
criminals were fed and clothed by the jail.”20 
Debtors continued enduring harsh treatment long after 
the colonies declared independence. Debtors’ prisons were 
not banned under federal law until 1833.21 For perspective, 
in Moore, Judge Sedita articulately noted: “Shamefully but 
tellingly, laws that permitted the deprivation of one’s liberty 
over a private debt were abolished more than three decades 
before the abolition of slavery.”22 Yet, for debtors, outlawing 
debtors’ prisons amounted to a nominal improvement at 
best.23 
At their inception, primitive bankruptcy laws provided 
debtors little protection. Congress rarely exercised the 
powers conferred under the Bankruptcy Clause, which 
empowered it “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject 
 
 19. John E. Matejkovic & Keith Rucinski, Bankruptcy “Reform”: The 21st 
Century’s Debtors’ Prison, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 473, 475–76 (2004) 
(explaining the “deplorable” conditions in debtors’ prisons, such as “16 debtors . . . 
crowded into a 12-foot square room.”). 
 20. Id. at 476. 
 21. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (2012) (prohibiting 
“imprisonment for debt”). But see Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into 
the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System 42 
WASHBURN L. J. 143, 147–49 (2002) (discussing debtors’ prisons’ history in the 
United States and arguing that de facto debtors’ prisons still exist because 
creditors attempt to use contempt as a means of imprisoning debtors). 
 22. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361. 
 23. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN NEW YORK 
STATE 1609–1866 148 (1938) (asserting that debtors’ imprisonment did not 
actually cease until 1881 despite New York “abolishing” the practice 50 years 
earlier in 1831); Creola Johnson, Creditors’ Use of Consumer Debt 
Criminalization Practices and Their Financial Abuse of Women, 34 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 5, 5–6 (2016) (“To many cash-strapped consumers, however, the 
debtors’ prison is alive and well in the twenty-first century.”). 
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of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”24 Unless 
Congress utilized this power, states remained free to enact 
bankruptcy legislation to fill the void.25 Absent congressional 
exercise of the Bankruptcy Clause, the prohibition of debtors’ 
prisons did not bind the states, and imprisoning debtors’ 
remained a common practice throughout the nineteenth 
century.26 During this period, there was no voluntary 
bankruptcy, rather, only compulsory filings initiated by 
creditors were permitted and obtaining a discharge 
depended entirely upon creditors’ consent.27 
Today, nonpayment of a private debt is a civil cause of 
action.28 As such, debtors are no longer imprisoned simply 
for defaulting on outstanding debts.29 Debtors today, 
supposedly, are not subjected to nearly as severe treatment 
when compared to previous eras.30 On the other hand, as 
Moore illustrates, prohibiting imprisonment for nonpayment 
gave rise to creditors utilizing contempt motions to imprison 
debtors to effectuate the same result.31 
Similarly, the deep-seated notion that defaulting on an 
obligation represents a quasi-criminal offense has not 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 25. Tabb, supra note 10, at 13–14 (noting that “states were free to act in 
bankruptcy matters for all but 16 of the first 109 years after the Constitution was 
ratified.”). 
 26. Id. at 12–13, 15–16; SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 148. 
 27. Compare Tabb, supra note 10, at 14–15 with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1129 
(2012) (requiring at least one impaired class of creditors to approve a 
reorganization plan before the debtor-in-possession can obtain a discharge). 
 28. Southern Chautauqua County Federal Credit Union v. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d 
360, 362 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (“The penalty imposed for [civil contempt] is designed to 
compensate or otherwise further the right of the party in whose favor a judicial 
direction was made.”). 
 29. Tabb, supra note 10, at 16. 
 30. See id; Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 362. 
 31. Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 362; Johnson, supra note 23, at 13–25; see James, 
supra note 21, at 149–54 (describing creditors employing civil contempt as a 
means to imprison debtors). 
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evaporated in American society.32 This historical 
condemnation of debtors coupled with creditors’ 
contemporary use of contempt as an alternative means to 
imprison debtors demonstrates that obvious remnants of 
early-American debtor-creditor jurisprudence remains 
today.33 Thus, such antiquated notions suddenly appear less 
antiquated than previously assumed. 
As debtors gradually started receiving more humane 
treatment, the average citizen’s indebtedness propensity 
steadily rose. In 2016, in credit card debt alone, the average 
American owed $3,600.34 However, this number is skewed 
because only forty percent of Americans have outstanding 
credit card debt.35 Therefore, among those who do carry a 
balance the figure is closer to $16,048—a ten percent 
increase since 2013.36 This trend is not a particularly new 
development, however, over the past century financial 
institutions’ lending propensity skyrocketed.37 
For a decade or so leading up to the Great Depression, 
Americans drastically shifted their opinions regarding credit 
and borrowing and kick-started the credit-based economy 
observed today.38 As one economist noted, “societal attitudes 
toward borrowers changed radically between 1900 and 1920; 
by the mid-1920s, buying on credit was considered normal, 
not sinful.”39 As this “buy now, pay later” trend continued, 
 
 32. See Cuomo Press Release, supra note 9; Tabb, supra note 10, at 7. 
 33. See, e.g., Moore, 39 N.Y.S.3d at 361–62; see generally Tabb, supra note 10. 
 34. Matthew Frankel, The Average American’s Credit Card Debt May Shock 
You, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
personalfinance/2016/10/12/average-credit-card-debt/91431058/. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Beverly M. Burden, Credit Cards and Home Equity Loans: You Have 
Been Preapproved . . . Why?,  6 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, 1 (1998). 
 38. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Household Debt and the Great Depression, 
HOUSE OF DEBT (Mar. 15, 2014), http://houseofdebt.org/2014/03/15/household-
debt-and-the-great-depression.html. 
 39. Id. (quoting Berkley economics professor Martha Olney). 
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financers’ lending models evolved as well. Diverse new 
lending models developed rapidly to accommodate the needs 
of nearly any willing borrower.40 One such development 
particularly relevant to debt collection is the so-called 
“payday loan.” 
Payday loans are short-term, high interest loans that are 
available almost instantaneously.41 In theory, a payday loan 
allows a debtor to pay his outstanding liabilities rather than 
defaulting, and he will repay the loan upon receiving his 
paycheck.42 In reality, the interest rates, sometimes as high 
as 7300%,43 render these payday loans nearly impossible to 
pay back. Consumers get caught in a trap because they 
“frequently do not understand the terms of the loans, and 
because [payday loans] arguably create a cycle of debt from 
which many customers cannot escape.”44 The following 
example illustrates how consumers get trapped in this 
downward spiral: 
Once one has used a payday loan, for example by borrowing $400 at 
$25 per $100 in order to pay the rent, the borrower will then owe an 
extra $200 every month, unless he or she can get out from under the 
initial loan by paying it off. That means there is $200 less 
 
 40. See Frankel, supra note 34; Burden, supra note 37, at 1. 
 41. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2004). 
 42. See id. But see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS ON 
PAYDAY, PAYDAY INSTALLMENT, AND VEHICLE TITLE LOANS, AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE 
PRODUCTS 109–12 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
Supplemental_Report_060116.pdf [hereinafter CFPB Supp.] (reporting that 
“[o]ver 80% of payday loans are reborrowed within 14 days from the same lender, 
85% are reborrowed within 30 days, and 88% are reborrowed within 60 days.”). 
 43. KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, THE COST OF CREDIT: 
REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 55 (2002); Chin, supra note 41, at 724; Al 
Vaughters, Outlaw Debt Collectors in WNY Targeted by Authorities, WIVB NEWS 
4 BUFFALO, N.Y. (APR. 24, 2015, 10:58 AM), http://wivb.com/2015/02/26/outlaw-
wny-debt-collectors-targeted-by-ny-ag-and-feds/. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
190.40 (2017) (criminalizing charging interest exceeding 25% “per annum or the 
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period” as 2d degree criminal usury, which 
is a class E felony). 
 44. Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double Down-and-Out: The Connection 
Between Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 SW. L. REV. 785, 786 (2010). 
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discretionary income available each month for other household 
items or necessities, which is enough money to be significant in 
many households, but particularly in households already experienc-
ing cash flow difficulties.45 
Predictably, for those who succumb to the pressure of 
taking payday loans, bankruptcy often follows.46 If there is 
not a “casual causation” between bankruptcy filings and 
payday loans, at the very least, there is a correlation.47 One 
report found that nearly twenty percent of New Mexico 
debtors who filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7 took out at 
least one payday loan.48 These loans are so notoriously 
prejudicial to consumers that some scholars argue that the 
practice implicates the Thirteenth Amendment,49 arguing 
that payday loans have such high, usurious interest rates 
that they effectually force debtors into indentured 
servitude.50 Consumers who narrowly escape filing 
bankruptcy, including some who do not, get the equally 
unpleasant experience of dealing with debt collectors.51 
 
 45. Id. at 787. 
 46. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause 
Bankruptcy? 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-
13, 2011) (“For first-time applicants near the 20th percentile of the credit-score 
distribution who identify the local average treatment effect, access to payday 
loans causes chapter 13 bankruptcy filings over the next two years to double.”) 
 47. See Martin & Tong, supra note 44. 
 48. Id. at 788. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 50. Zoë Elizabeth Lees, Note, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment 
Implications in Payday Lending, 15 SCHOLAR 63, 66 (2012). See also CFPB Supp., 
supra note 42, at 132; Johnson, supra note 23, at 29–39 (arguing that women are 
more susceptible to paying debt collectors when threatened with arrest); 
 51. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office W.D.N.Y., Debt Collection 
Agency Owner Indicted On 41 Charges; Accused of Bilking Thousands of Victims 
Out of Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/debt-collection-agency-owner-indicted-41-
charges-accused-bilking-thousands-victims-out [hereinafter DOJ Press Release] 
(discussing Buffalo collectors brazenly violating the automatic stay by 
misrepresenting themselves as associates of the consumers’ bankruptcy attorney 
and threatening criminal prosecution if the debtor did not pay). 
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The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), 
defines “debt collector” as “any person who uses any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any 
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 
any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, 
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 
owed or due another.”52 By contrast, “creditor” is defined as 
any person: 
who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is 
owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that 
he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for 
the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.53 
It follows that, “[t]he FDCPA distinguishes between debt 
collectors, who are subject to the statute’s requirements, and 
creditors, who are not.”54 This small distinction between 
creditors, who actually own the right to repayment, and 
collectors, complicates an ostensibly straightforward 
definition, as collectors devise strategies to avoid collection 
law mandates.55 
In Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, the corporate 
defendant (“Triumph”), attempting to avoid liability, 
asserted that it did not meet the statutory definition of a 
“debt collector.”56 Triumph argued that “it is a creditor and 
not a debt collector because it purchases delinquent debt 
thereby becoming one ‘to whom a debt is owed’ under section 
1692a(4) [of the FDCPA].”57 The court held that “a party that 
seeks to collect on a debt that was in default when acquired 
is a debt collector under the FDCPA, ‘even though it owns 
 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2012). 
 53. § 1692a(4). 
 54. Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 55. See FTC SENTINEL DATABASE, supra note 5, at 81 (noting that in 2016, of 
the 859,090 debt collection complaints the FTC received, only 2,146 (0.025%) were 
against creditors; the remaining 99.75% were against third party debt collectors). 
 56. 577 F.3d at 796. 
 57. Id. 
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the debt and is collecting for itself.’”58 In the end, the Ruth 
court reversed the district court’s order granting defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment,59 but the standard applied 
highlights how unique complications can arise from a 
standard that depends on the debt’s status when acquired 
rather than the parties’ conduct.60 
Securitization blurs the ever-finer line between 
“creditor” and “collector.”61 Now “paper”—the industry term 
for debt—is bought, sold, and traded as frequently as 
securities.62 A collector can purchase a portfolio, acquiring all 
rights to repayment for the debts contained therein, without 
extending any credit whatsoever.63 From a business 
prospective, each outstanding debt represents a fraction of 
the creditor’s accounts receivable.64 Accounts receivable are 
freely transferable assets.65 The securitization process 
involves dividing a business’s accounts receivable, or 
individual debts, and compiling them into a portfolio.66 Thus, 
the purchaser’s risk is limited to the portfolio’s price, while 
the original creditor mitigates their potential losses by 
selling their right to repayment. In this situation, everyone 
wins, except for debtors. 
Consumer debt securitization is an example of one 
rapidly increasing, deleterious means to advance financiers’ 
 
 58. Id. at 797 (quoting McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 
(7th Cir. 2008)). 
 59. Id. at 806. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Andreas Jobst, What Is Securitization?, FIN. & DEV. 48, 48–49 (Sept. 
2008), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf 
(providing a basic overview of the securitization process). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Ruth, 577 F.3d at 796–98; Burden, supra note 37. 
 64. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Assignment of Accounts Receivables Under 
Article 9: Structural Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 231, 233 
(2007). 
 65. See id. at 233–34. 
 66. See Jobst, supra note 61, at 48. 
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goals in a credit-based economy.67 
The supply of consumer loan products such as credit card and home 
equity loans has grown because of the profitability of securitizations 
of consumer debt instruments. Ten years ago securitizations of con-
sumer loans were virtually unheard of. Today, almost half of all out-
standing credit card loans, $180 billion out of $400 billion outstand-
ing, have been securitized and sold.68 
This form of securitization is nearly identical to 
mortgage-backed securitization; it differs only to the extent 
that consumer debts are almost exclusively unsecured.69 
This distinction is important. Anyone acquiring a secured 
property interest can only foreclose or repossess the 
collateral securing the loan once.70 It follows, when secured 
creditors fail to comply with the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) or collection laws, their security interest is adversely 
affected—they potentially forfeit the right to repossess the 
collateral or, in some cases, incur punitive damages.71 This 
is not an issue with unsecured debt because no collateral 
exists. Therefore, collectors have nothing to lose if they 
engage in deceptive, fraudulent, or illegal collection tactics. 
Lacking any self-interest compelling them to comply with 
collection laws, collectors are virtually unrestrained when 
developing and utilizing deceptive or fraudulent collection 
schemes. 
Likewise, because the securitization process divorces the 
original creditor from the underlying obligation, debtors’ 
 
 67. See id. at 48, 49. 
 68. Burden, supra note 37. 
 69. See id. (describing the availability of credit today). 
 70. See Plank, supra note 64, at 233–38 (highlighting issues in perfection of 
security interests in accounts receivable); Davis Interview, supra note 7 
(describing multiple collection attempts on the same debt). 
 71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012) (outlining remedies available to debtors harmed 
by creditor(s)’ violation of the automatic stay, which expressly provides for 
punitive damages in “appropriate circumstances.”); U.C.C. § 9-625 (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). 
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ability to verify debts is substantially impaired.72 More often 
than not, a debt portfolio will change hands many times 
before any collection attempts are made. For creditors 
disinterested in collections, selling the obligation completely 
removes them from the collection process.73 Even if the 
original creditor predominately places debt with a legally 
compliant collection agency, that agency often is far removed 
from the equation by the time the debt lands in WNY.74 
Legally compliant agencies will “work” a portfolio for as 
long as it remains profitable, but when the revenue stream 
starts running dry, there is a strong incentive to sell the 
remaining, uncollected debts. This process exemplifies the 
economic law of diminishing marginal returns. After an 
agency collects a certain percentage of the portfolio, the rate 
of return will continually decline.75 To illustrate, imagine a 
compliant company successfully collected sixty percent of a 
portfolio. That agency is better off selling the remaining forty 
percent to another at a discount rate. Selling the portfolio’s 
remaining debt allows employees to collect on debt yielding 
a higher rate of return.76 
 
 72. See Jobst, supra note 61, at 48. 
 73. See, e.g., Jamie Kocis, United States: Uncertainty in Securitization of 
Consumer Debt Continues After Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Madden v. 
Midland Funding, MONDAQ (July 22, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/
unitedstates/x/512524/securitization+structured+finance/Uncertainty+in+Secur
itization+of+Consumer+Debt+Continues+After+Supreme+Court+Denies+Certio
rari+in+Madden+v+Midland+Funding. 
 74. See Jake Halpern, Will Guys with Guns Replace the Agency Elizabeth 
Warren Created?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/26/opinion/sunday/will-guys-with-guns-replace-the-agency-elizabeth-
warren-created.html?_r=0. 
 75. For an overview of the law of diminishing marginal returns, see Law of 
Diminishing Marginal Returns, FARLEX FINANCIAL DICTIONARY (2012), 
https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Law+of+diminishing+
marginal+returns. 
 76. Regardless of whether or not the business is run lawfully, profit 
maximization is governed by the laws of economics. In the context of collections, 
this means selling the partially worked paper until it is no longer profitable. See 
id. 
2018] WILD WEST OF DEBT COLLECTION 253 
As previously noted, payday loans account for a majority 
of the debt WNY agencies collect, which helped fortify the 
region as the nation’s “debt collection capital.”77 
Notwithstanding the numerous articles documenting the 
contemporary issues concerning payday loans, these loans 
only contribute to the rogue-debt-collection industry’s rapid 
expansion in WNY. 78 The purpose of this Comment is not to 
minimalize payday loan’s noxious effects nor detract from 
other’s arguments that consumers require greater protection 
from and education about pitfalls attending high-interest 
borrowing.79 Rather, the purpose is to shed light on other, 
often ignored, issues that will not simply evaporate if 
remedial measures focus merely on the underlying debt and 
ignore the collection tactics employed. 
While deleterious in effect, the general notion behind 
payday lending is not inherently wrongful.80 Payday loans 
operate according to the same fundamental principles as any 
other loan: a creditor provides access to capital for a borrower 
to cover liabilities or make new purchases, which the 
borrower agrees to pay back, over a fixed-term or on demand, 
with interest.81 Payday loans follow this basic scheme, with 
the caveat that interest is astronomically high and they have 
incredibly short fixed-terms.82 Certainly these unfavorable 
conditions adversely affect debtors, but, standing alone, they 
are not inherently harmful. Nor do lenders disguise or 
misrepresent the consumer’s contractual obligations 
 
 77. Nick Baumann, Inside the Bizarre, Unregulated World of Debt Collection, 
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/
interview-bad-paper-jake-halpern-debt-collectors (“Buffalo, New York—the 
fading industrial city that, oddly enough, has become America’s debt-collection 
capital.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 41, at 724–26. 
 79. See, e.g., id. 
 80. See Frankel, supra note 34. 
 81. Chin, supra note 41, at 724. 
 82. Id. 
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pursuant to the loan agreement.83 Instead, payday lenders 
convince desperate consumers to agree to unconscionable 
terms.84 Frequent payday loan defaults occur because 
consumers erroneously overestimate their ability to repay 
the loan, not because they are ignorant as to the contract’s 
terms.85 When entering into these agreements they 
overzealously estimate their future earning potential. 
The ideology that freedom to contract is an inalienable, 
individual right remains well-entrenched in American 
society. American history reveals that many judges and legal 
scholars adhered to this ideology since the nation’s founding. 
There is no better example of this than Lochner v. New 
York,86 and the so-called Lochner-era that followed. In 
Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law 
regulating how many hours bakery employees could work.87 
Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham did not merely 
state that the freedom to contract conforms with the 
prevailing notions of jurisprudence, but held that the 
Constitution guaranteed this freedom under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88 While Lochner is widely regarded as “one of 
 
 83. See, e.g., Alpha Omega Consulting Grp., Inc., Payday Loan Agreement,  
http://www.aocg.com/resources/NM1-CASH%20ADVANCE%20CONTRACT.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2017). 
 84. Compare Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 459 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding “that where the element of unconscionability is present 
at the time a contract is made, the contract should not be enforced.”), with CFPB 
Supp., supra note 42, at 109–137 (demonstrating the unconscionable nature of 
payday loans). 
 85. See CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 100–08. But see Scott A. Schaaf,From 
Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 339, 349 (2001) (outlining payday lenders arguments that “disclosing the 
APR on payday loans is misleading” and that customers have a “very high degree 
of satisfaction with the [payday lending] system”). 
 86. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 87. Id. at 64. 
 88. Id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business 
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Federal Constitution.”). 
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the most condemned cases in United States history,”89 it 
highlights how deeply-rooted the freedom the contract is in 
American society. 
While the Supreme Court later ostensibly overturned 
Lochner,90 the underlying ideology—that freedom to contract 
is absolute—has survived. This lingering ideology coupled 
with harsh remedies readily available to creditors in 
previous eras is largely why collection efforts are not well-
monitored and collection laws are unenforced. It is precisely 
this lack of enforcement and industry oversight that caused 
Buffalo, New York, to become the new “Wild West,” where 
anything goes so long as someone pays. 
II. THE COLLECTION SCHEME & HOW IT WORKS 
Contrary to popular belief, debt collection is a difficult 
business. Nobody enjoys handing over his hard-earned wages 
to debt collectors, especially if skeptical of the debt’s validity. 
Yet, this is precisely what Buffalo collectors convince debtors 
to do every day. How, then, are so many agencies able to 
accomplish something that seems counterintuitive? Quite 
simply, debt collection is only difficult when it is done 
lawfully.91 
When the debt collection industry exploded in Buffalo, 
debt collectors realized that they could substantially increase 
their profit margins by simply ignoring collection laws. 
Collectors soon realized that such flagrant illegality would 
only succeed if they could disguise their true identities and 
trick debtors into believing their legitimacy.92 Luckily for 
 
 89. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 
(1980). 
 90. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392–93 (1937) (repudiating 
Lochner and effectually overturning the decision). 
 91. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. See generally Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (2010). 
 92. See F.T.C. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 111084, at *3–*4,  *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
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these collectors, this is not difficult to accomplish with the 
rise of modern technology.93 Thus, Buffalo collection agencies 
devised and implemented a three-stage collection approach 
specifically designed to confuse debtors and render the 
collector’s representations plausible.94 
The process begins with a “point caller.” Point callers 
make initial contact with the debtors to verify the debtor’s 
contact information. They tend to have limited debt 
collection experience and are instructed not to deviate from 
their “talk-off” scripts.95 First, they will call the debtor’s last 
known phone number(s).96 These calls are rarely successful 
because debtors often do not answer or their contact 
information is outdated.97 If able to reach the targeted 
debtor, the point caller leaves a “shake message.”98 
A shake message typically involves the caller vaguely 
referencing a debt while threatening some form of legal 
action to follow if the recipient does not return the call. Some 
agencies leave horrendous shake messages to scare debtors, 
while others utilize fairly benign scripts that are just 
intimidating enough to illicit a response from the debtor.99 
 
 93. E.g., The Ultimate Skip Tracking Tool that Delivers Deeper Insights, 
TLOXP: COLLECTIONS, http://www.tlo.com/collections-video (last visited Nov. 1, 
2017). 
 94. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084, at *7 (noting 
that “by separating the debt collection business into (at least) three parts—the 
owner of the debt, the call initiator, and the payment processor—Defendants 
hoped to insulate themselves from any wrongdoing on the part of those who 
contacted consumers.”). See also Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3, (“Defendants’ 
outrageous conduct generated scores of consumer complaints, but they structured 
the operation to delay or evade liability for their illegal practices.”). 
 95. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 34–48 (describing the content of “talk-off” 
scripts used by WNY debt collectors). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Many complaints report harassment of the debtor’s relatives or friends 
where the collector does not stop pestering the recipient until they locate the 
debtor. See FTC SENTINEL DATABASE, supra note 5. 
 98. Id. at 36–37. 
 99. See id. at 34–48. 
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Inexperienced collectors pose the risk of mistakenly 
revealing information that could cause a debtor to question 
the legitimacy of the company or caller. Therefore, requiring 
strict adherence to prewritten scripts insulates agencies 
from early exposure. 
If the point callers are unable to reach the debtor 
directly, they begin calling the debtor’s family and friends.100 
They will continue calling until someone who knows the 
debtor answers.101 Once point callers reach a debtor’s friend 
or family member, they provide a vague but intimidating 
explanation for the call to compel whomever answers to scare 
the debtor into returning the call.102 If one does get a live 
debtor on the phone, he plays dumb and tells the debtor to 
call the “[l]egal [f]rim [sic] that hired [him].”103 Point callers 
provide debtors a different number to call someone who will 
explain the situation, and, if questioned, the point callers 
state that they are merely a “process server” or something 
similar.104 And so begins the second phase. 
When debtors call “the firm” handling the case, a “live 
server” answers—invariably with a misleading or fake 
company name.105 Based on the point callers’ 
representations, debtors believe they are speaking with an 
 
 100. See id. at 57–59. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Declaration of Colin A. Hector in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at Exhibit 158, FTC. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-
CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017). 
 104. Declaration of Heath Earls Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 at 2, FTC v. 
Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 
(W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Earls Decl.]; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 
32–33, 83. 
 105. Declaration of Karen Davis Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 at 22–23, FTC 
v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084 
(W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017) [hereinafter Davis Decl.]; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 
29. Cf, Pfeiffer, supra note 8 (“Collana was an associate of Ciffa’s who established 
shell companies, payment processing accounts, and bank accounts to facilitate 
taking payments from individuals.”). 
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attorney or law enforcement official.106 Alternatively, once 
point callers confirm debtors’ contact information, live 
servers start calling debtors from a spoofed phone number.107 
This is where the real intimidation starts. Messages are 
easily saved, but scared debtors very rarely record live calls, 
allowing live servers to threaten debtors with anything from 
excessive fines to substantial prison time.108 These threats 
may cause even suspicious debtors to question whether or 
not they should simply pay in case the threats are true.109 
Live servers are experienced collectors who know what 
to say and how to say it to intimidate debtors.110 They are 
able to cleverly evade questions directed at the company’s 
legitimacy or physical location.111 Live servers are rude, 
demanding, and argumentative, which allows them to 
dominate the conversation.112 Similarly, they possess a 
shocking dearth of empathy.113 They maintain a threatening 
and cold attitude throughout the conversation regardless of 
the hardships they knowingly force debtors to endure.114 
After speaking with live servers, many debtors are terrified 
and ultimately agree to do whatever it takes to come up with 
the money demanded.115 
If the debtors agree to pay, the live servers provide 
 
 106. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1; Fairbanks, supra note 1. 
 107. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 28, 30. 
 108. See id. at 35–48. 
 109. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–48. 
 110. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1, 2–3. 
 111. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 112. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 2. 
 113. See, e.g., Zeke Faux, Millions Are Hounded for Debt They Don’t Owe. One 
Victim Fought Back, With a Vengeance, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Dec. 6, 2017) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-12-06/millions-are-hounded-for-
debt-they-don-t-owe-one-victim-fought-back-with-a-vengeance. 
 114. See generally Earls Decl., supra note 104 (discussing how a debt collector 
was capable of forcing the individual to provide a payment despite his struggle to 
find the money). 
 115. E.g., id. at 1–2. 
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another number for the debtors to call when they have the 
funds to make a payment, which they often need to borrow 
from friends or family.116 This is the third phase of the 
scheme. If the debtors inquire why they need to call another 
number to make a payment, live servers have seemingly 
plausible answers—e.g., they only handle the legal issues—
the other number is for the payment processor.117 Many 
debtors do not think twice about this explanation because 
they believe separate payment processing is commonplace 
and fear what consequences might follow. 
Portfolio owners need not sell the portfolio to have 
another agency “work” it, they may also “place” it.118 Placing 
a portfolio is analogous to renting the rights to collect to 
another company, who remits collection commissions back to 
the owner—it’s like a reverse consignment.119 As detailed 
below, this causes conflict when collectors illegitimately 
continue working debt portfolios after they are subsequently 
placed with another agency.120 
Many people assume that there is official documentation 
for these portfolios. They are misinformed. Debt portfolios 
are nothing more than spreadsheets with the original 
lender’s name, the principle amount of the debt, and the 
debtor’s information—which is frequently outdated.121 
Collectors can easily download, save, and share these 
portfolios even when they are no longer legitimately working 
 
 116. See id. at 1–2; Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3–4; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 
20–22. 
 117. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 2–4; Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 3–5, 9–
16; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 68–77. 
 118. See Ruth v. Triumph P’ships, 577 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing 
debt brokers buying and selling debt, but distinguishing themselves from 
collectors); Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 119. See U.C.C. § 9-102(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (defining 
“consignment” under the U.C.C.). 
 120. Interview with Anonymous Informant, former Vantage Point Services 
Debt Collector, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Informant Interview]. 
 121. Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–27. 
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it.122 It is a common practice among many rogue collection 
shops to keep these portfolios after working them.123 This 
practice results in portfolios containing illegitimate debts.124 
Because debts are bought, placed, and traded so often, 
creditors, collectors, and debtors have a hard time 
maintaining accurate information.125 Therefore, when 
portfolio owners subsequently place a portfolio with another 
collection agency, concurrent attempts to collect the same 
debt can occur, rendering verification impossible for the 
debtor.126 
Sometimes these illegitimate collection attempts are 
merely negligent and involve no intentional malfeasance. 
Unfortunately, however, negligent mistakes are the 
exception. A majority of illegitimate collection attempts 
result from collectors’ conscious and voluntary acts designed 
to deceive and exploit debtors.127 Collection agencies will 
frequently work a portfolio then, in turn, sell it, including 
debts they’ve already collected, to another agency as a 
purportedly valid debt portfolio.128 Rogue collection agencies 
have no qualms about collecting a debt before reselling it,129 
 
 122. See id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 123. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 124. Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–27. 
 125. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 126. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 
(2017), https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Consumer-Complaints/s6ew-
h6mp [hereinafter CFPB Database] (compiling debt collection complaints 
received by the CFBP, many of which state that the collection agency could not 
verify the debt or provided insufficient verification). 
 127. See Interview with Kevin Sibley, Asst. Special Agent in Charge, U.S Dep’t 
of Homeland Security, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter ASAC Sibley 
Interview]. 
 128. E.g., Phil Fairbanks, Debt Collector Accused of ‘Re-Dos’ to Collect Multiple 
Times, BUFF. NEWS (June 27, 2017), http://buffalonews.com/2017/06/26/feds-
charge-local-debt-collector-fraud/?utm_campaign=puma&utm_medium=social&
utm_source=Twitter (addressing how WNY agencies are engaging in “re-do’s,”—
or double collections; naturally, if collectors will re-collect debts they will clearly 
resell them as well). 
 129. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
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as doing so yields greater profits. 
Greater profits sufficiently incentivize collectors to 
forego their obligation of good-faith and fair-dealing, or even 
common decency.130 This is especially true when a portfolio 
does not “hit”—meaning debtors are not paying—because 
acting within the socially defined moral boundaries does not 
generate revenue.131 Therefore, collectors will leave the 
collected debts in a portfolio, but they resell or place the debt, 
causing another agency to inadvertently rework it.132 This 
maximizes recovery for sunk costs expended if they acquire 
an otherwise unprofitable portfolio. 
Aggregately, these practices amount to a problem 
necessitating a solution beyond merely regulating payday 
loans.133 Payday loans are not the only type of debt being 
collected.134 Rogue collectors will work any type of consumer 
debt, including credit card debt,135 outstanding medical bills, 
and even student loans. Furthermore, some valid payday 
loans made over a decade ago remain. Collectors do not want 
to write-off these debts simply because the statute of 
limitations has run. This is why solely regulating payday 
lending will not solve the problem because such regulation 
does not address the harassing and illegal tactics currently 
employed in WNY collection agencies.136 
 
 130. See id. (admitting that the collector-informant “knew it was wrong, but it 
was all about the money”). 
 131. See Cuomo Press Release, supra note 9. 
 132. See FTC. v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC, No. 15-CV-6S, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 111084, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2017); Pfeiffer, supra note 8. 
 133. See generally Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the 
New CFPB Protect Civilians from Payday Lending?, 69 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 649 
(2012); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 
87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 134. See Burden, supra note 37 (indicating that modern credit availability will 
subject new debts and types of debtors to collections). 
 135. See id.; Kocis, supra note 73. 
 136. CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 79–99 (finding that certain states’ efforts 
to reduce consumer access to payday loans were unsuccessful and, ultimately, did 
not affect stores’ revenue). 
262 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
III. ISSUES & ILLEGAL PRACTICES 
While the collection crisis in WNY affects various forms 
of consumer debt, the majority consists of credit card and 
payday loan debt.137 Payday loans are most appealing to 
members of society with the fewest resources.138 Without 
sufficient due diligence as to a consumers’ credit-worthiness, 
payday lenders dangle a carrot of liquid capital just large 
enough to lure helpless, desperate, and often uninformed 
consumers into chasing a short-term sense of financial 
stability.139 That feeling erodes quickly once the loan’s short 
fixed-term is up,140 and the creditor demands repayment at 
an incredibly high interest rate.141 
Sadly, these schemes target financially distressed 
consumers.142 Lenders take advantage of those in the lowest 
socioeconomic class, who correspondingly are the least 
educated.143 One report noted that Americans with the 
lowest net worth have the highest amount of outstanding 
credit card debt.144 While these lending practices are morally 
disgraceful, the reprehensible and predatory strategies 
collection agencies’ employ are arguably worse because they 
are designed to prey on the debtors’ assumed ignorance of the 
 
 137. See Plummer v. Atl. Credit & Fin., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 484, 484–88 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). See generally CFPB Database, supra note 126. 
 138. CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 74–76. See Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1075–76 (N. D. Cal 2015) (defining the “least 
sophisticated” consumer that the FDCPA seeks to protect). 
 139. Chin, supra note 41, at 723–25. See also ASAC Sibley Interview, supra 
note 127. 
 140. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–14. 
 141. Chin, supra note 41, at 724. See also Keest & Renuart, supra note 43, at 
55. 
 142. Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28. 
 143. See id. at 728. 
 144. Frankel, supra note 34 (finding the average credit card debt among those 
with a negative or zero-net-worth is $10,307, which is 27% higher than the group 
with the next highest average). 
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law and fear of arrest or civil liability.145 
Collectors also appear to lack any moral compass as 
evidenced by their wrongful collection attempts. They siphon 
every possible cent out of debtors without regard to other 
necessities.146 Many complaints documented by the FTC’s 
and Consumer Finance Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) 
complaint databases tell heart-wrenching stories. For 
example, elderly consumers complain of having to choose 
between purchasing their prescription medications or paying 
the collectors.147 Examples like this are common but appear 
with the highest concentration in WNY.148 
Exacerbating these predatory tactics, once a debtor pays, 
collectors target them because they know “that debtor will 
continue paying.” What follows is a cyclical pattern where 
debtors forego critical necessities, electing to pay collectors 
instead, just to stop the harassment. In return, collectors 
give debtors a brief reprieve before collections begin anew, 
and the process repeats itself.149 
Collectors do everything in their power to foster a sense 
of panic and urgency in debtors.150 This inevitably clouds the 
 
 145. Johnson, supra note 21, at 13–28 (discussing predatory tactics employed 
when collecting from economically distressed individuals). See also Chin, supra 
note 41, at 727–28. 
 146. Johnson, supra note 21, at 31–35. 
 147. Johnson, supra note 21, at 35–36; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 148. See Fairbanks, supra note 1 (“‘Buffalo is ground zero for debt collection 
companies that routinely violate state and federal debt collection laws,’ . . . [t]he 
debt collection industry has a long history here and Morrissey suspects the bad 
eggs learned the trade from legitimate collectors before going out on their own,” 
(quoting Assistant Attorney General James M. Morrissey)). 
 149. See CFPB Supp., supra note 42, at 100–05; Press Release, Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau, (July 10, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-payday-
borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt/ [hereinafter CFPB Press Release] (attaching “[t]he 
ACE cycle-of-debt training manual graphic,” which shows how ACE designed 
their business model to trap consumers in a “cycle-of-debt”); Fairbanks, supra 
note 128; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 150. CFPB Press Release, supra note 149. 
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debtors’ judgment, which is precisely the collectors’ intent. 
Unable to think rationally, tunnel vision precludes debtors 
from noticing any otherwise obvious “red flags.”151 Any 
reluctance is met with offensive, aggressive, and accusatory 
responses from the collector.152 Aggressive tactics and insults 
directed at the debtor are designed to confuse them into 
believing the collector’s legitimacy; to most, the contradictory 
nature of this approach is only obvious retrospectively.153 
As previously discussed, collectors specifically target 
society’s lower socioeconomic classes because they are 
typically the least educated.154 Preying on less educated or 
elderly individuals allows collectors to employ flagrantly 
illegal tactics because these individuals are least likely to 
know collection laws or how the legal system functions.155 
Most importantly, these debtors do not realize the distinction 
between civil and criminal actions;156 they do not know that 
non-payment of debts is not a criminal offense.157 
Fearing criminal prosecution, debtors will do anything 
and everything they can to locate funds.158 Many have 
families to support, and they fear that their children will be 
taken away if they are convicted of a criminal offense.159 This 
 
 151. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 3. 
 152. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 153. Cf. id. (highlighting the consumer’s confusion and initial reaction to the 
collector, which was not to question the debt but instead try to avoid going to 
prison). 
 154. Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28. 
 155. See id; Burden, supra note 37. See generally Johnson, supra note 23 
(describing how collectors tailor their schemes to prey on the most vulnerable 
consumers). 
 156. See Informant Interview, supra note 120; Johnson, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 157. Johnson, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 158. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3; Johnson, supra note 23, at 
29–40. 
 159. See Johnson, supra note 23, at 29–40 (arguing that women are 
disproportionally affected when subjected to predatory collection tactics). 
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belief directly results from the collector’s statements.160 Of 
course, none of these statements are true, and they all violate 
the FDCPA.161 Even if they don’t whole-heartedly believe the 
threats, uneducated and unsuspecting debtors might 
conclude that they should pay anyway to ease their fears.162 
The following two egregious examples illustrate the extent to 
which collectors engage in repulsive conduct. 
The first example demonstrates the despicable manner 
in which collectors talk to debtors. In this case, a debtor 
recorded a collector threatening to rape her minor daughter 
if she did not pay the alleged balance—despite the debtor’s 
insistence that she had no outstanding debt.163 This threat is 
more than just reprehensible—it is a felony offense in New 
York State.164 Collectors have demonstrated equal cruelty in 
their harassing tactics. 
A second heart-wrenching example involves a collector 
who continually harassed an elderly gentleman immediately 
after the death of his wife.165 Tragically, this poor man woke 
up to find his wife had passed away during the night.166 In 
the midst of arranging for the coroner to remove his wife’s 
body, and while awaiting a return call from the coroner, a 
 
 160. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–48; Earls Decl., supra note 104, 
at 1. 
 161. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2010); Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 47. 
 162. See Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3. 
 163. Alex Henderson, ‘Am I Going to Have to Kill You?’ ALTERNET (April 17, 
2011), https://www.alternet.org/story/150638/%27am_i_going_to_have_to_kill_
you%27%3A_the_horrific_ways_abusive_debt_collectors_threaten_and_harass_t
heir_victims. 
 164. A person is guilty of First Degree Coercion under New York law if they 
compel or induce another to engage in conduct that they have a right to abstain 
from “by instilling in the victim a fear that he or she will cause physical injury to 
a person.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.65. 
 165. Pls. Complaint and attached audio recordings (on file with author), FTC 
v. 4 Star Resolution, LLC, No. 15-CV-112S, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40597 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015). 
 166. Id. 
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collector called demanding payment.167 To no avail, this grief 
stricken man pleaded with the collector to allow him a few 
hours to deal with the situation.168 The collector steadfastly 
refused to postpone his collection attempt. Instead, despite 
the man’s sobs and pleas, this collector continuously kept 
soliciting payment.169 
Attempting to capitalize on the debtor’s grief this 
collector taunted the man saying things such as: “your wife 
would’ve wanted you to take care of this—it’s the right thing 
to do,” and “I don’t want to have to call you again.”170 The 
collector’s continuous calls did not cease until the man’s 
probation officer validated his claims.171 While this 
demonstrates an unfathomable dearth of compassion and 
morality, these examples don’t reveal the fraudulent 
conspiracy underlying this scheme. 
A. “Double Banging” 
“Predatory,” “threatening,” and “harassing” are terms 
that barely scratch the surface of illegal conduct in which 
WNY collectors engage. Arguably the most shocking practice 
is collecting on “re-dos”—also known as “double banging”—
which means that the same agency collects on a single debt 
multiple times.172 In the most heinous examples, double 
collection attempts occur while the debtor is still making 
installment payments on the first attempt.173 While regular 
monitoring of credit reports would likely inform consumers 
whether collectors’ demands are valid, unsophisticated 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: 
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016 16–20, 28–29 (2016); Fairbanks, supra note 128. 
 173. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 3–4 (describing a collector’s 
repeated calls in attempt to solicit additional money from a consumer). 
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consumers are unlikely to do so. Instead, when threatened, 
often these debtors simply pay.174 
Unfortunately for those who presumably believe that 
paying will stop the agency’s collection efforts, they’ve just 
made themselves targets.175 Counterintuitively for an 
honest, well-intentioned debtor, making payments actually 
places a sign on his back that says: “I’m easily intimidated, 
and will pay.” These are precisely the people collectors want 
to identify.176 Once identified, collectors will “double bang” 
consumers who pay by engaging in the same tactics that they 
did the first time.177 
To do so, on subsequent collection attempts, collectors 
merely represent themselves as a different agency.178 In fact, 
the same techniques that agencies employ to mask their 
illegal conduct from law enforcement also enables collectors 
to “double bang” debtors.179 
Collectors frequently misrepresent themselves and their 
agency’s real name over the phone. They do this primarily 
because it further insulates them from their illegal collection 
tactics. But a secondary benefit is that varying their agency’s 
name facilitates double-banging. Collectors must use a 
different agency name when re-collecting a debt, but agency 
names are easily fabricated over the phone. Moreover, 
agency owners and managers frequently “stash” registered 
LLCs and d/b/a names so that the agency name reported to 
the Better Business Bureau (BBB), FTC, or New York 
Attorney General (NYAG) does not match the name given to 
debtors.180 
 
 174. E.g., id. at 1–3. 
 175. See, e.g., Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 51 (listing eight different company 
names that a single agency used when contacting consumers). 
 179. See id.; Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 180. See Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 
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They do this to prepare for the point at which the name 
they are using generates a substantial number of complaints; 
they then inevitably switch to a clean name.181 Having these 
alternative agency names at their disposal is what allows 
collectors to collect from the same debtor multiple times.182 
Similarly, collectors often change their phone numbers 
for largely the same reasons that they change the company 
name.183 Thus, anytime they change their name and phone 
number it is as if they have just acquired a new portfolio to 
work, except that this portfolio exclusively consists of 
“debtors” whom they know are susceptible to their predatory 
tactics. In this scenario, slightly tweaking their talk-off 
script, method of payment demanded, or varying their 
payment accounts sufficiently blinds debtors to the fraud 
perpetrated against them.184 
To clarify, not every agency engages in double banging, 
but the practice is by no means rare.185 Moreover, because 
paper is placed, traded, bought, and sold so frequently, even 
agencies attempting to follow the laws may inadvertently 
engage in double banging.186 As previously noted, many 
shops will sell “bad paper”—meaning portfolios that they 
have already worked—thus rendering validation impossible 
and double collection attempts inevitable.187 
 
1, at 29–39. 
 181. Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also, supra note 105 and 
accompanying text; Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 182. See Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 23 tbl.10. 
 183. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 22–29. 
 184. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 185. Cf. Fairbanks, supra note 128. 
 186. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 187. Baumann, supra note 77 (“One other huge problem is there’s no system in 
place for tracking who owns these debts. Imagine a system where there’s no chain 
of titles for cars, no VIN numbers, and no DMV. There’d be total chaos!”); Faux, 
supra note 113 (“Therrien had been caught up in a fraud known as phantom debt, 
where millions of Americans are hassled to pay back money they don’t owe . . . It 
begins when someone scoops up troves of personal information that are available 
cheaply online—old loan applications, long-expired obligations, data from hacked 
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Notably, not all collectors who engage in this practice are 
culpable. Collection agency managers can “scrub” the 
portfolio—essentially clear all previously entered collector 
notes—and then assign it to a collector who unknowingly 
double bangs the debtor.188 Similarly, rather than scrubbing 
paper, they can also “scramble” the portfolio.189 Functionally, 
scrambling is no different than scrubbing; it differs to the 
extent that scrubbing involves reassigning each debt to a 
different debtor as opposed clearing any information 
regarding collections.190 
Collectors are effective at “talking-off” debtors’ 
concerns.191 They convincingly insist that they know nothing 
about any prior collection attempts and fervently reiterate 
that the only way they can “help” is to stop the pending legal 
action—which they can only do after the “debtor” pays.192 
At their inception, many of these methods began out of 
necessity rather than willful attempts to defraud debtors. As 
collection agencies began to amass mountains of complaints 
against them, apprehensive creditors started refusing to 
place or sell paper in WNY. This, in and of itself, should 
demonstrate how pervasive unlawful collection tactics are in 
the region.193 Unable to find paper for their collectors to 
work, owners sought new ways to continue collecting; thus, 
they devised the double bang.194 While borne out of necessity, 
owners struck gold in devising the notion of double banging 
debtors as opposed to seeking out and purchasing new 
 
accounts—and reformats it to look like a list of debts. Then they make deals with 
unscrupulous collectors who will demand repayment of the fictitious bills”). 
 188. Id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 189. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See JAKE HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE 
UNDERWORLD 15 (2014). 
 192. See e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 36–60. 
 193. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 194. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8. 
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debt.195 
The scheme is the gift that keeps on giving; collectors can 
recover far more than a debt’s face value while eliminating 
the debt scarcity problem. Not only does this approach yield 
greater gross income—it costs nothing. Double banging 
creates a seemingly untamable beast that employees must 
continually feed to get paid.196 In this way, collectors become 
slaves to the beast. They cannot stop collecting because they 
depend on their paychecks; therefore, when paper is scarce, 
the only option for collectors is to “double bang.”197 
In the worst collection agencies, informants revealed 
that, not only is this practice commonplace, but it’s repeated 
as often as possible. Collectors are known to double bang 
debtors currently making installment payments on their own 
previous collection attempt.198 Sadly, because of tactics like 
this, there are victims to this fraudulent scheme who pay 
collectors more than ten times the principal amount actually 
“owed.”199 
Rarely does a debtor’s principal balance exceed a few 
hundred dollars.200 Yet, in the worst cases, victims paid over 
$10,000 to satisfy a single debt amounting to a mere fraction 
of that.201 Instead of feeling guilt or empathy, however, 
collectors mock these victims. Evidence uncovered in some of 
these agencies includes collectors’ notes showing blatant 
 
 195. See, e.g., Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 2–19 tbl.1–7. 
 196. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 197. See id; HALPERN, supra note 191, at 57–58; Davis Interview, supra note 7; 
Fairbanks, supra note 1; infra text accompanying note 268. 
 198. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 199. See Davis Interview, supra note 7 (noting, once again, that many debts 
collected are illegal to collect on in the first place). 
 200. Payday loan debts typically range from $100–$800; however, debtors 
sometimes pay thousands of dollars to “satisfy” the same debt multiple times. See 
Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 201. Davis Interview, supra note 7. Cf. supra notes 41–51 and accompanying 
text (referencing the pitfalls attending high-interest lending models). 
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amusement that they got prior victims to re-pay.202 
Appallingly, many of these collectors seem to actually take 
pride in their ability to continuously elicit payments from 
victims.203 
B. Dealing “PiFs” & Lead Sheets 
For WNY collection agencies, attempts to collect on 
illegitimate debts do not stop at double banging. Many 
collectors will continue to work recalled paper, or 
alternatively, intentionally sell bad paper, and this practice 
is rapidly increasing.204 There are agencies now that deal 
exclusively in accounts already “paid in full” (PiFs).205 They 
trade PiFs like kids trade baseball cards.206 Instead of 
purchasing new debt or paying a commission for collections, 
they simply swap PiF accounts with other agencies. This 
practice is as deplorable as it is fraudulent. Agencies 
exclusively collecting on PiF paper inherently make zero 
valid collection attempts because there are no valid debts to 
collect—like re-do’s, they have already been collected. 
At these type of agencies, collectors’ claims to consumers 
are patently false. A collector “unaware” of prior payments 
or collection attempts for the debt they are currently 
attempting to collect may very well be the same debt the 
debtor already paid.207 It is true that sometimes collectors do 
 
 202. Davis Interview, supra note 7. Cf. Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 29–36 
(describing documents uncovered pursuant to an immediate access search of a 
collection agency office space where law enforcement officials found these notes 
on collectors’ desks). 
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debtors to panic, but rather from the collectors’ ability to receive a paycheck for 
effective double banging, See Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 204. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 3–7. 
 205. See, e.g., Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 206. Id. See also supra notes 61–76 and accompanying text (describing the 
complications that arise with securitization and commercial resale of accounts 
receivable). 
 207. See Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
272 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
not “know” any details regarding prior payments or 
collections, but because the details are documented on the 
collection software (unless someone scrubbed the paper), 
surely they realize that the current attempt is illegitimate.208 
Collectors get equal commission bonuses for legitimate and 
illegitimate collections which incentivizes fervent collection 
attempts without regard to the debt’s legitimacy.209 
Recently, multiple agencies began generating 
complaints concerning payday loan collection attempts 
against “debtors” who never applied for—much less took 
out—a payday loan.210 This phenomenon results from the 
dealing of so called “lead sheets.”211 Anyone researching 
payday loans is first prompted to enter their personal 
information before accessing any information.212 Even if that 
individual elects not to take a loan, which often happens due 
to the usurious terms, the information that the prospective 
debtor provided is recorded.213 It is precisely this information 
that is compiled into lead sheets. 
Collectors soon realized that these lead sheets are as 
good, if not better, than actual paper. Working lead sheets 
allows collectors to maintain the sense of urgency they create 
simply by insisting that the consumer can plead his case to a 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. Cf. HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14. 
 210. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 27–60. See also Davis Interview, 
supra note 7. 
 211. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 212. Cf. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU TO OVERSEE DEBT COLLECTION MARKET 1,  https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_debt-collection-factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 2012) 
[hereinafter Debt Collections Fact Sheet] (“Examiners will assess whether debt 
collectors are using accurate data in their pursuit of debt. Inaccurate information 
can lead to collectors attempting to collect debt that consumers do not owe or 
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 213. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–28; Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t. 
of Fin. Servs., DFS Announces Settlement with Two Debt Buyers Resulting in $3 
Million of Restitution to Thousands of New York Consumers (May 18, 2016), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/prl605181.html. 
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judge during ensuing legal proceedings, which they insist are 
inevitable if the debtor does not pay.214 
Armed with premeditated, somewhat rational, talking 
points, collectors can generate nearly equivalent revenue 
collecting off lead-sheets as they could working legitimate 
debt.215 Once again, they rely heavily on debtors’ assumed 
ignorance, thus rendering this practice not only possible, but 
profitable.216 What is more, lead-sheets are commonly 
bought and sold just like debt portfolios in WNY,217 once 
again, demonstrating collectors’ immunity to debt scarcity—
who needs to buy legitimate debt when it can be conjured out 
of thin air? 
The scariest aspect of this development, at least for the 
individuals who appear on these sheets, is the extent to 
which their information is distributed. Consumers have no 
way of knowing who will eventually access their information, 
or for what purpose.218 
Between “double banging” debtors, dealing in “PiFs,” and 
working lead-sheets, it is clear that, under the veil of 
“collections,” WNY agencies devised a well-orchestrated 
scam designed to defraud consumers across the country. The 
critical difference between these operations and other scams 
is that these collectors shroud fraudulent activity as 
legitimate employment.219 In this way, WNY collectors slip 
through the cracks while authorities concentrate on higher 
profile, well-known scams, which in turn allows collectors to 
hide in plain sight.220 
 
 214. See Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 7. 
 215. Cf. HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14 (discussing collectors who were 
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 217. See Davis Interview, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 23, at 25–28. 
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C. Specific FDCPA Violations 
Overall, the FDCPA does not impose a substantial 
burden for legally compliant collection agencies.221 There are 
nuanced provisions, but in general, the FDCPA simply 
mandates that collectors act honestly,222 refrain from 
harassment,223 and interact with debtors in a professional 
manner.224 The statute is fairly summarized as outlawing 
collectors from making any misrepresentations as to their 
purpose for contacting a debtor.225 These are not difficult or 
burdensome requirements, but simply expected as a matter 
of professional courtesy in the vast majority of occupations. 
Parties to valid contracts are bound by an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.226 The securitization 
process, in theory, eliminates the privity upon which this 
implied covenant is founded because the creditor sells the 
debtor’s obligation to repay.227 On the other hand, collection 
 
bumped into at the grocery store, but there wasn’t a whole lot of interaction 
because Buffalo is very stratified.”). 
 221. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. 
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 223. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
 224. Id. § 1692c. 
 225. Ruth, 577 F.3d at 797–800 (requiring extrinsic evidence to establish 
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consumer.); Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1071 (N.D. 
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 226. See Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 418, 431 (W.D. Pa. 
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2018] WILD WEST OF DEBT COLLECTION 275 
agencies tacitly assume this duty when acquiring a creditor’s 
contractual rights, but they are sufficiently removed from the 
debtor to ignore it without consequence. Thus, the 
misrepresentations collectors make to debtors violate this 
implicit obligation, which alone is sufficient grounds for 
voiding the debtor’s obligation to repay arising from the 
obligation.228 
Under the FDCPA, collectors are required to provide a 
“mini-Miranda” disclaimer stating that they are contacting 
the debtor in an attempt to collect on a debt, and any 
information gathered will be used for that purpose.229 
Additionally, debtors are entitled to receive verification of 
the debt in writing from the collector.230 The logical rationale 
for this requirement is that individuals who dispute a debt’s 
validity are assured of it prior to paying an unknown agency. 
The burden collectors face complying with the verification 
and disclaimer requirements is minimal. Unsurprisingly, 
however, rogue agencies in WNY routinely fail to comply 
with even minimal statutory requirements.231 Far too often, 
collectors are unable to verify the debt, which explains 
collectors’ wholesale disregard for minimal statutory 
mandates.232 
 
not). 
 228. Cf. Desantis v. Roz-Ber, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 244, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(highlighting that the FDCPA seeks to impose strict liability for violations, unless 
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 229. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11); Drolet v. Phillips Reinhard & Assocs., No. 14-
CV-406-JTC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754, at *4 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016) 
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 231. Drolet, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754, at *3–4 n.1; HALPERN, supra note 
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 232. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 26–27. 
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Congress mandated these requirements to ensure equity 
and to allow consumers an opportunity to dispute invalid 
debts.233 Holding a consumer liable for an invalid debt 
unquestionably contravenes equitable bargaining principles 
and undermines congressional intent.234 Collectors in rogue 
agencies, however, thrive on inequity to elevate their 
position relative to the consumer and compel payment.235 
Thus, to avoid sending verification notices to debtors, 
collectors create justifications and conjure exigent 
circumstances rendering verification impossible.236 This is 
because, to bolster the appearance of exigency, collectors 
misrepresent themselves and their principal to appear as if 
they are a law enforcement agency located within the 
debtor’s jurisdiction.237 
Call “spoofing” technology allows collectors to falsify 
their area codes and the name appearing on the debtor’s 
caller ID.238 Debtors located in Texas or Florida, for example, 
are apt to realize the collector’s illegitimacy if the caller’s 
area code originates in WNY. Even an “unsophisticated 
consumer” who noticed this discrepancy would second-guess 
the collector’s legitimacy.239 Therefore, collectors use 
 
 233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (“[c]ongressional findings and declaration of 
purpose”). 
 234. See id. 
 235. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14; Johnson, supra note 23, at 42–
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 236. Cf. Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–55. 
 237. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 238. Describing the importance of technology in facilitating debt collectors’ 
fraudulent scheme, ASAC Sibley stated that technology makes illegal debt 
collection possible because consumers tend to believe information conveyed by 
their caller ID, especially when the collector feigns authority and they have no 
reason to think otherwise. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. See also, e.g., 
Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 239. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 
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MSJ, supra note 3. 
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technology to eliminate this discrepancy and appear as if 
they have legitimate legal authority. 
The FDCPA also limits when collectors can contact 
debtors’ family or friends and what information they can 
disclose.240 Similarly, the FDCPA prohibits collectors from 
harassing either debtors or third parties.241 Once again, 
WNY collection agencies rarely comply with these 
mandates.242 
Should collectors’ attempts to intimidate debtors into 
paying prove unsuccessful, harassment provides an 
alternative means through which to compel payment.243 
Many consumers who dispute the debt, or are otherwise 
unmotivated by collectors’ threats, eventually elect to pay 
anyway merely to alleviate collectors harassing themselves, 
loved ones, or employers.244 Moreover, disclosure limitations 
are intended to stop collectors from purposely attempting to 
embarrass the consumer or adversely influence opinions of 
their friends, family, or employer.245 When these regulations 
are unenforced, many consumers reach the point where 
paying is less costly than dealing with constant harassment. 
The cost of harassment goes beyond merely the cost of 
enduring it; collectors will purposely harass a debtor’s 
employer, and potentially jeopardize the debtor’s 
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employment.246 This is a calculated and effective tactic for 
collectors because, as noted above, individuals most 
susceptible to taking payday loans, or amassing substantial 
credit card debt, are precisely the type who cannot afford to 
lose their job.247 This situation exemplifies the rationale for 
prohibiting such collection tactics, which congress sought to 
do by enacting the FDCPA.248 Unfortunately, these statutory 
prohibitions are meaningless absent effective enforcement. 
D. Threats to Arrest 
As previously mentioned, another egregious FDCPA 
violation that collectors frequently employ is threatening the 
debtor with arrest and subsequent criminal prosecution.249 
Threats such as these are not anomalies nor are they merely 
practices in which a few rogue employees engage to boost 
their commissions; they are incorporated into scripts that 
collectors are specifically directed to use when leaving 
messages for the debtor.250 One agency used the same script 
consistently enough that law enforcement began to identify 
various assumed company names the agency used by 
comparing nearly identical consumer complaints attributed 
to “different” agencies.251 There, collectors told every debtor 
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threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.”). See generally Johnson, supra 
note 23 (describing how prevalent criminalization tactics are in the debt 
collection industry and why they are effective— especially when made to women). 
 250. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–33, 35–48. See also Patrice 
Hendriksen, CFPB and NY AG File Joint Lawsuit Against Debt Collectors, 
CONSUMER FINANCE ENFORCEMENT WATCH (Nov. 4, 2016), 
http://www.enforcementwatch.com/2016/11/04/cfpb-and-ny-ag-file-joint-lawsuit-
against-debt-collectors/ 
 251. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 13–16. See also supra note 107 and 
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that creditors retained their company to file a “two-part 
felony complaint for federal check (or wire) fraud.”252 They 
then bolstered this threat by convincing the debtor that 
officers would “pick [them] up” for these charges that day, 
sometimes within mere hours.253 Fortunately for debtors, or 
so they are told, they can avoid arrest and criminal 
prosecution if they obtain a “court release number.”254 This 
will issue, however, only after the debtor pays. 
The frequency of these threats is astonishing. In one 
case, out of one hundred randomly sampled audio recordings, 
the NYAG identified eighty calls explicitly containing a false 
representation.255 This means that within a “95% confidence 
interval for the frequency of false representations in calls 
lasting 40 seconds or greater,” 70.9% to 87.3% of calls 
contained a false representation.256 Within the same sample, 
collectors explicitly threatened arrest or detainment in fifty-
two of these calls. 257 This amounts to a frequency of 41.8% 
to 62.1% calls containing threats to arrest or detain within a 
95% confidence interval.258 
Employing such a tactic places a strict temporal 
limitation on a debtor’s payment, which creates a sense of 
urgency. This renders debtors susceptible to believing 
collectors when they are told that there is not enough time to 
validate the debt.259 Likewise, debtors believe that they do 
not have time to research the company’s legitimacy nor the 
 
accompanying text (referencing call-spoofing technology and how its employed in 
the debt collection industry). 
 252. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 48–55. 
 253. Id. at 42. 
 254. See, e.g., id. 
 255. Id. at 59. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 59–60. 
 259. See id. at 35–42 (demonstrating the short amount of time that collectors 
tell debtors they have to resolve the dispute before charges will be filed). 
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charges cited by the collector; they are focused on gathering 
sufficient funds to pay and avoid arrest. 
Even a cursory reflection on the purported charges in 
many cases would reveal the collection attempt’s fraudulent 
nature.260 For example, one agency alleged that they 
intended to file a criminal complaint for soliciting incorrect 
information.261 The “charge” itself is both nonsensical and 
oxymoronic. How would one even attempt to solicit incorrect 
information? Providing incorrect information in an attempt 
to defraud another, of course, is a requisite element of 
common law fraud,262 but it does not follow that someone 
could intentionally solicit the same in an attempt to defraud 
another. Yet, partially due to the debtor’s ignorance of the 
law and partially out of fear of arrest, many victims fail to 
notice this inherent contradiction.263 
This tactic is most repulsive when contacting consumers 
who do not have any outstanding debt. On the other hand, 
the more suspect the debt, the more aggressive the tactics 
and threats collectors employ to collect it.264 When collecting 
legitimate debts, legitimate collectors have legal remedies 
available, which gives them an incentive not to forfeit these 
remedies by engaging in illegal tactics.265 On the other hand, 
if the debt is illegitimate, collectors have nothing to lose; they 
see only greater commissions when threatening to arrest 
debtors who otherwise would have no incentive to pay a debt 
 
 260. See, e.g., id. at 35–47. 
 261. Cf. id. at 35–47, 52–54. 
 262. Banque Arabe Et Internationale D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 57 
F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995) (“To prove common law fraud under New York law, 
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as a result of such reliance.”). 
 263. See, e.g., Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1–3. 
 264. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14; Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 35–
55. 
 265. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
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that they legitimately do not owe.266 
E. Collectors Representing Themselves as “Attorneys,” 
“Investigators,” or Law Enforcement Officials 
Attempting to substantiate their threats to arrest a 
debtor, frequently on imaginary charges, collectors must also 
misrepresent their authority to bring such charges.267 Thus, 
collectors falsely identify themselves as attorneys, local law 
enforcement officers, or federal agents to establish a 
presumption of legitimacy.268 Using different area codes and 
call spoofing technology enables collectors to maintain their 
apparent legitimacy.269 When collectors spoof calls the 
recipient’s caller ID, in addition to misrepresenting the area 
code, they can also misrepresent the organization from which 
the call originates.270 For debtors, it appears as if they are 
receiving a call from a law enforcement agency or district 
attorney’s office.271 This misrepresentation is reinforced 
when the caller’s area code matches that of the debtor’s. This 
is why collectors maintain an overabundance of phone 
numbers with different area codes or employ call spoofing 
technology.272 
When a debtor calls back into the live server, they 
answer as if they are a “legal processing” or law firm, which, 
of course, is patently false.273 Recently, one WNY agency 
went as far as representing itself as an agent of the NYAG; 
presumably in an attempt to delegitimize the organization, 
 
 266. Informant Interview, supra note 120. 
 267. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–33, 35–60. 
 268. See, e.g., id. 
 269. See, e.g., id. at 30–31, 33. 
 270. E.g., id. at 30, 33. 
 271. E.g., id. at 30–31. 
 272. See, e.g., id. 
 273. See, e.g., id. at 35–60. 
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and to illicit fear in the debtor.274 The NYAG has recovered 
a majority of the restitution payments pursuant to 
judgments obtained in WNY for unlawful collections.275 
Fortunately for debtors, this idea backfired. Collectors’ 
misrepresentations caused three separate debtors to 
inadvertently call the real NYAG’s office, who then used 
their statements as evidence of the collections agency’s 
wrongful conduct.276 
Not only does the FDCPA prohibit misrepresentations 
such as these, but it also prohibits collectors from 
threatening any action that they cannot, or do not, actually 
intend to take.277 Obviously, collectors lack any authority to 
carry out the threatened actions, especially where there is no 
valid underlying debt. Rather, these collectors are typically 
the type who are otherwise unemployable in any legitimate 
business. 
1. Who Collectors Really Are 
In reality, a majority of WNY collectors are degenerates, 
gang-bangers, and/or ex-convicts, which makes them perfect 
for the industry.278 Individuals who lack any sense of 
morality or compassion are exactly the type who thrive in 
collections.279 The industry attracts those who have no 
qualms about breaking the law.280 An entrepreneur starting 
his own collection agency described the types of employees 
 
 274. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) provides: 
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading repre-
sentation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without 
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct 
is a violation of this section . . . [t]he threat to take any action that can-
not legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. 
 278. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. 
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he wanted to attract as “ex-cons, drug addicts, twenty-
somethings without high school diplomas, and a variety of 
other hard-luck cases . . . [because] the more clean-cut types 
simply wouldn’t get the job done.”281 Especially in the case of 
ex-convicts, who are precisely the people who require 
documentation verifying that they are meaningfully 
employed to show their parole or probation officers, it is no 
wonder why these employees are the best “hustlers.”282 
Because the industry and its attending illegal practices go 
largely unnoticed, post-release supervision officers have no 
way of recognizing the difference between “telemarketing,” 
and fraudulent debt collection, allowing collectors to slip 
through the cracks.283 
Given the type of individuals attracted to this industry, 
narcotics abuse within WNY collection agencies is 
pervasive.284 NYAG investigators, while working 
undercover, have observed collectors using marijuana, 
cocaine, and everything in between at work.285 Evidence 
indicated that some employees even injected heroin in the 
office.286 Substance abuse in these agencies is so pervasive 
and severe that NYAG investigators witnessed collectors 
“huffing” magic markers at work to ease withdrawal 
symptoms.287 Pervasive substance abuse helps explain the 
utter lack of morality common among WNY collectors; they 
will do anything to make money to feed their habits, 
especially when disguised as legitimate employment. 
Additionally, substance abuse problems provide insight 
 
 281. Id. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See id. at 12–13; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 284. See, e.g., HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13 (describing how a collection 
agency manager “had to help break up a fight that began when a collector 
overcharged his co-worker for a bag of cocaine.”). 
 285. See, e.g., id.; Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 286. Davis Interview, supra note 7. See also HALPERN, supra note 191, at 13. 
 287. Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
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as to why, despite millions of dollars flowing into these 
agencies, collectors often attempt to unfreeze assets to pay 
attorney’s fees when defending legal action against them.288 
The NYAG’s Senior Consumer Frauds Representative for the 
Buffalo Regional Office, Karen Davis, mockingly 
summarized the prevalence of narcotics in the WNY 
collection industry: “[i]t’s almost hard to tell if they are 
laundering drug money through collections, or vice-versa; 
laundering [illicit debt] collection proceeds through 
drugs.”289 Not that collectors could actually “launder” money 
through illicit means such as narcotic sales, but the point is 
that illegitimately acquired funds are all converted to cash 
and other property, which makes the proceeds difficult to 
trace and recover. 
If the collectors’ conduct described thus far is not 
outrageous enough, fear not—it gets worse. A substantial 
number of collectors receive government benefits such as 
Medicaid and Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) subsidies.290 
In reality, collectors are relatively well-compensated, yet 
they not only avoid paying any income tax but actually 
receive government benefits because their employer does not 
accurately report their wages.291 Defrauding the government 
is not exclusive to lower-level collectors; managers and even 
some collection agency owners reap whatever government 
benefits they can siphon from taxpayers.292 
Given the callous examples of greed already addressed, 
collection agency owners and managers fraudulently 
receiving government benefits should come as no surprise. 
 
 288. See Fairbanks, supra note 1 (describing a Buffalo collector named Alan 
Ceccarelli, who, during his sentencing hearing, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and 
aggravated identity theft and “pointed to a decade-long addiction to cocaine, 
heroin, and crack cocaine as the motivation for his crimes.”). 
 289. Davis Interview, supra note 7. See also HALPERN, supra note 191, at 12–
13; Fairbanks, supra note 1. 
 290. See, e.g., Pheiffer, supra note 7. 
 291. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 292. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 8. 
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Surprising or not, it does not render the practice any less 
outrageous. NYAG investigators uncovered evidence of 
managers making over $100,000 per year while receiving 
government subsidies.293 In one particularly egregious case, 
an agency owner’s actual income exceeded $1,250,000 for a 
single year, yet he still received Medicaid benefits—as did 
the rest of his family.294 
Since 2010, hundreds of millions of dollars have flowed 
into WNY through these agencies.295 Collection agency 
owners realized that it saved them money if employees filed 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax documents as 
“independent contractors,” because this frees employees 
from regular tax withholdings, allowing owners to 
manipulate both business and personal tax documents.296 
Moreover, employees are commonly paid in cash, or they 
receive their paychecks from a separate, supposedly 
unrelated, company, so that paychecks received are not 
attributed to their employer’s payroll expenses.297 Many 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. (describing a criminal action currently pending in the Western District 
of New York, where, in addition to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, “[f]ederal 
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 297. See, e.g., Davis Decl., supra note 105, at 2–17 (outlining the regular 
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managers and employees stash wire transfer service and/or 
money order accounts to ensure that their operation 
continues when accounts are frozen or closed due to 
chargebacks.298 Additionally, so that the money never stops 
flowing, owners segregate their various business expenses so 
that they are paid out of different accounts.299 They sweep 
accounts almost daily so assets are not frozen, or if they are, 
it is a small sum.300 
F. “Over-BiFing” 
The terminology in the industry for the principal balance 
is referred to as the “balance in full” or “BiF.” Due to New 
York’s usury laws, collectors are prohibited from collecting 
usurious interest or fees over the principal debt.301 Thus, 
especially when remitting commissions to the debt owner 
when working placed debt, collecting the actual balance 
yields noticeably smaller profits. To increase their bottom 
line, WNY collectors responded by “over-BiFing”—
indiscriminately overstating the balance in full by including 
amounts prohibited by law.302 
This practice is flagrantly illegal.303 Over-BiFing is so 
prevalent in WNY that many agencies categorically add 
hundreds of dollars to the balance; inflating debts and 
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collecting amounts debtors do not owe.304 The worst 
offenders quote balances that exceed six-hundred percent of 
the actual balance.305 What is more, this practice is not 
limited to valid debts. Contradictory as it sounds, over-
BiFing occurs even when collectors know the underlying debt 
is invalid.306 In almost every case, the arbitrary amount that 
collectors add to the underlying debt, standing alone, violates 
contemporary usury laws. 
Besides the obvious appeal of increasing revenue, over-
BiFing serves another important purpose for rogue collection 
agencies—it creates a cushion for collectors. This cushion 
enables collectors to offer debtors the option of satisfying the 
full balance—a “satisfaction in full”—by paying a sum lower 
than the stated balance.307 The catch is that this satisfaction 
amount is still higher than the actual balance, assuming an 
actual balance even exists.308 This allows collectors to feign 
sympathy for the debtor and insist that they are doing 
everything they can to “help” by waiving or reducing fees.309 
Convincingly, collectors engage in fictitious bartering that is, 
in reality, not a bargain at all; it merely lessens the monetary 
damages incurred by debtors—unless collectors decide to re-
collect the debt.310 
 
 304. See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB and New York 
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Similarly, collectors manifest their desire to “help” 
victims by offering the option of paying in installments. Once 
again, this is by no means a bargain. There is a caveat; the 
aggregate sum of installment payments amounts to a higher 
total than the already “over-BiFed” balance.311 This clever 
tactic, manifested as a benefit to the debtor, actually helps 
collectors maximize profits because the agency recovers more 
than the full amount of the “debt” on top of any excess 
already added in.312 
Finally, this installment benefit is only available to 
debtors who seem willing to pay but lack the funds and/or 
any means to acquire them.313 Because impending criminal 
prosecution is a commonly used threat against debtors, when 
no such action is taken collectors’ misrepresentations become 
readily apparent to debtors.314 Thus, offering installment 
payments is the collectors’ last “hail-Mary” attempt at 
recovery, in which case slowly siphoning the debtor’s money 
is better than forfeiting their chances of recovery 
altogether.315 
G. Skip Tracing Services 
Western New York collectors, like collectors elsewhere, 
rely heavily on the use of skip-tracing services to locate 
debtors; but because WNY agencies primarily collect old or 
illegitimate debt, these services are critical to their 
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 311. See Carbin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126937, at *1; CFPB & NYAG Press 
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operations.316  A skip-tracing agency is defined as “[a] service 
that locates persons (such as delinquent debtors . . .) or 
missing assets.”317 The rise of modern technology has 
drastically altered the nature of skip-tracing services. 
Creditors or collectors no longer need to utilize a skip-tracing 
agency to physically locate debtors—now they simply can 
purchase an online skip-tracing service account to locate 
debtors remotely.318 For example, in its online advertisement 
the preferred skip-tracing service for WNY collectors, 
TransUnion’s TLOxp, specifically targets collection agencies 
and highlights the service’s ability to “locate even the 
hardest to reach individuals.”319 This service allows 
collectors to perform their own skip-tracing for a relatively 
low cost without ever leaving the office.320 
While skip-tracing services, such as TLOxp are greatly 
beneficial when used for legitimate purposes, they are also a 
critical element that facilitates illegal collection practices. 
Armed with only a name and prior address, collectors can 
obtain an unfathomable amount of debtors’ personal 
 
 316. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 317. Skiptracing Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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information.321 This information serves as a basis for 
collector’s misrepresentations.322 Debtors are inherently apt 
to believe that the collector is legitimate when the caller 
knows information such as their current address, license 
number, and social security number.323 
To make matters worse, remote skip-tracing service 
providers either lack sufficient oversight procedures to 
monitor their product’s use, or the procedures currently 
employed are grossly insufficient to ensure that subscribers 
comply with the terms and conditions of permissible use.324 
Likewise, these service providers lack pre-screening 
procedures for potential subscribers—instead, they offer a 
free trial subscription to essentially anyone interested in 
their service.325 
The only readily identifiable oversight procedure skip-
tracing service providers purportedly employ is to monitor 
users’ internet service provider (ISP) address. Ideally, this 
measure allows only one subscriber to login at a time.326 
Given modern technology, however, this “oversight” is 
entirely ineffective. Nearly all WNY agencies set up their 
system such that one collector can sign into the software 
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2018] WILD WEST OF DEBT COLLECTION 291 
while the rest of the office accesses the account remotely.327 
To monitors, this appears as a single subscriber using a 
known ISP address when, in reality, the entire office has 
access to the software.328 
The critical role skip-tracing software plays in WNY 
collection agencies’ fraudulent scheme cannot be overstated. 
Many illegal practices described in this Comment are only 
possible through the use of skip-tracing software.329 Without 
access to this software, collectors could not “scramble” 
portfolios nor collect off lead-sheets because they would lack 
sufficient information to even contact their intended 
victims.330 Or, even if collectors could contact their target, 
they would lack sufficient knowledge about the target’s 
personal information to render their misrepresentations 
remotely plausible.331 
Relatedly, the aggregate potential for harm that such 
unfettered access to consumers’ personal information may 
cause remains unknown. What is clear is that the 
possibilities are endless for creative criminals.332 To 
reiterate, most collectors are far from model citizens; in fact, 
many already have extensive criminal backgrounds.333 
Access to this degree of information promotes an 
environment ripe for identity theft.334 These risks are more 
than just unsettling; for those who are particularly at risk, 
the ramifications are terrifying. Imagine, for example, the 
potential risk for a domestic violence victim if their abuser 
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could obtain all of their personal information.335 While the 
extent of these risks is not yet known, one thing is certain—
they are unacceptable. 
IV. ISSUES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
Buffalo stands alone in the debt collection industry.336 
Surely there are collection agencies engaging in illegal 
practices elsewhere, but these occurrences are far more 
isolated and pale in comparison to those occurring in 
WNY.337 Once the debt collection boom began, it did not take 
long for the proverbial floodgates to open and for illegal 
practices to spread like wildfire across the region.338 Shortly 
thereafter, the FTC, CFPB, and NYAG’s Buffalo Regional 
Office started receiving an unprecedented number of 
consumer “third party debt collection” complaints.339 
Curiously, Buffalo stood alone—no other NYAG regional 
office received more than a handful of debt collection 
complaints.340 At this time, the NYAG’s database did not 
even have a classification code for these complaints. Without 
complaints appearing elsewhere in the state, debt collection 
appeared as a relatively insignificant, isolated problem, so 
enforcing collection laws took a backseat to seemingly more-
pressing illegal activities. This allowed unlawful conduct to 
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in similar tactics). 
 338. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 339. See generally CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126; Davis Interview, supra 
note 7. 
 340. Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
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permeate the region, rapidly increasing in both severity and 
pervasiveness.341 Employees fired for violating collection 
laws would simply move on to another agency where they 
introduced the same illegal tactics.342 Then, noticing their 
new coworker’s success, other employees naturally adopted 
the same tactics.343 
If these illegal practices are so pervasive among WNY 
collection agencies, the question naturally follows: why 
hasn’t law enforcement done something to stop it? The short 
answer is that law enforcement agencies are trying, but lack 
the resources to do so effectively. This answer does not 
sufficiently address the complexities of the problem however. 
First, regarding criminal conduct, these offenses 
frequently go unnoticed in the region because New York 
outlawed payday lending and collection within the state.344 
This prohibition conceals collectors’ illegal conduct from law 
enforcement officials in the region,345 allowing collectors to 
fly under law enforcement’s radar, and coincidently enables 
the industry’s isolated boom in WNY. 
The New York prohibition only protects New Yorkers. 
Collectors may collect payday loans from New York State as 
long as the target debtor resides elsewhere.346 This 
distinction creates an environment tailored to this type of 
 
 341. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 27–60. See generally HALPERN, supra 
note 191. 
 342. See HALPERN, supra note 191, at 14–15. 
 343. See id. (discussing the tendency of collectors to simply move from agency 
to agency). 
 344. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40; N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 340, 373. 
 345. See Davis Interview, supra note 7 (discussing interactions with local law 
enforcement, Ms. Davis stated: “They simply have no clue how the industry 
functions. Collectors go to their parole officers’ who don’t second-guess [the 
collectors] when they say they work in “telemarketing” or “customer service;” 
what else would they say—’I’m point-caller.’”). 
 346. New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Payday Lending in New York: What 
You Need to Know (May 15, 2014, 11:01 am), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/
consumer/paydayloans.htm (“It is also illegal for a debt collector to collect, or 
attempt to collect, on a payday loan in New York State.”) (emphasis added). 
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criminal activity because it segregates victims from the 
collectors who prey on them.347 Already overworked, local 
law enforcement officials’ primary concern is protecting their 
local constituency. Despite the flagrant criminality occurring 
within their jurisdiction, a dearth of victims blinded local law 
enforcement officials to the fraudulent conspiracy afoot.348  
Even if local officials had realized the degree of illegal 
activity occurring sooner, they could not have afforded to 
allocate sufficient resources to remediate the problem at 
their constituents’ expense.349 Local officials are primarily 
concerned with protecting local constituents, and rightfully 
so. This is especially true for elected officials who count on 
constituents’ votes for reelection. 
This is not to say that public officials condone or willfully 
ignore ongoing criminal activity within their jurisdiction. On 
one hand, victims, who are nearly universally located outside 
New York, are unlikely to report complaints in WNY.350 On 
the other hand, local police or district attorneys’ offices, for 
example, simply have too many local cases to refocus their 
attention.351 Thus, the effect is two-fold: lacking a 
substantial number of victim reports, local officials do not 
realize the gravity of harm caused by collectors, but even if 
they did, rarely can local officials allocate sufficient time and 
resources to conduct a thorough investigation.352 
The limited number of complaints trickling back to local 
authorities fails to paint an adequate picture of the pervasive 
 
 347. See Neil Bhutta et. al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59 
J. L. & ECON. 225, 227 (2016). 
 348. See, e.g., Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
 349. See, e.g., id. 
 350. See CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126. 
 351. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. 
Schneiderman Releases New York’s Top Ten Frauds of 2016, Warns Consumers 
to Beware of Scammers (Mar. 6, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-releases-new-yorks-top-ten-frauds-2016-warns-consumers-
beware-scammers. 
 352. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. 
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fraudulent conduct.353 Viewed in isolation, no matter how 
sympathetic the victim or egregious the collector’s conduct, 
complaints are written off as rare occurrences perpetrated by 
a handful of rogue collectors.354 With local officials’ scarce 
time and resources already extended to their outer limits, the 
costs attending complex, time-consuming investigations 
clearly appear to outweigh the benefits when there are no 
local victims. 
The inter-state nature of this fraudulent debt collection 
scheme hinders both criminal and civil actions.355 For 
example, New York General Business Law § 349 expressly 
prohibits any “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of 
any business, trade or commerce.”356 Courts have afforded 
Section 349 broad construction, interpreting any consumer-
oriented business practice having the “capacity to mislead or 
deceive a reasonable person” sufficient for establishing a 
statutory violation.357 
On the other hand, while the NYAG’s powers are 
expressly confined to specific matters, they are particularly 
narrow in the context of criminal prosecution.358 This 
 
 353. See id. (noting that because they lack familiarity with the industry, local 
authorities fail to fully grasp the extent of debt collectors’ fraudulent scheme even 
when complaints are received). 
 354. See Davis Interview, supra note 7. While the CFPB receives substantial 
complaints regarding Buffalo debt collectors, local enforcement agencies often do 
not receive them. See generally CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126. 
 355. See Kaufman v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686–88 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (pointing out that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 does not extend to 
cases where a deceptive scheme originates in N.Y. but injurious consumer 
transaction occurs elsewhere). 
 356. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a). 
 357. Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 725 N.E.2d 598, 606 (N.Y. 1999). 
 358. People v. Goldswer, 358 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Schoharie Cty. Ct. 1974) 
(highlighting that legislative action has expressly limited the general jurisdiction 
prosecutorial power conferred unto the Attorney General to cases where certain 
conditions precedent are met). But see People v. General Electric Co., Inc., 756 
N.Y.S. 2d 520, 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) 
authorizes the Attorney General to take legal action protecting consumers from 
acts that have “the capacity or tendency to deceive, or creates an atmosphere 
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reaffirms the principle that the NYAG’s duties are primarily 
civil.359 Under Section 349, the NYAG is empowered to, and 
frequently does, pursue civil actions to seek restitution for 
victims of consumer fraud perpetrated within the state.360 
The statute’s primary purpose is to provide a remedy for any 
victims of consumer fraud. However, the NYAG’s primary 
duty is to the people of New York. For this reason, the NYAG 
alone cannot utilize the statute’s broad scope while 
adequately upholding its duty to the people of New York. 
Exacerbating this, the illegal conduct is isolated to WNY, 
and the NYAG’s Buffalo Regional Office has a single attorney 
responsible for the entire Consumer Fraud Bureau. 
Likewise, NYAG criminal prosecutors cannot divert 
attention from their substantial caseload. Thus, like local 
authorities, scarce resources preclude the NYAG from 
undertaking the type of comprehensive legal action, criminal 
or civil, necessary to adequately enforce consumer protection 
laws regulating debt collection. 
In addition to the NYAG, New York General Business 
Law § 349 provides a private cause of action for actual 
victims harmed by deceptive or fraudulent business 
practices.361 Unfortunately, for these victims, more often 
 
conducive to fraud.”); State v. Princess Prestige, 366 N.E. 2d 61, 62 (1977). 
 359. But see Gaidon, 725 N.E.2d at 603 (stating that N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 
expressly confers unto the Attorney General “enforcement power to curtail 
deceptive acts and practices—willful or otherwise—directed at the consuming 
public”); In re Prudential Advert. Inc. v. Attorney Gen., N.Y.S.2d 491, 492–93 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (noting that, under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12), the Attorney 
General “clearly is authorized to investigate alleged repeated acts committed in 
the course of the conduct of business activities in this State which are fraudulent 
within the meaning which the law by common usage attaches to that word.”). 
 360. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(b) (empowering the Attorney General to 
bring actions against any legal entity engaging in deceptive practices and to 
“obtain restitution of any moneys or property obtained directly or indirectly by 
any such unlawful acts or practices.”). 
 361. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349; Bildstein v. MasterCard 
Int’l Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (delineating the elements 
a plaintiff must establish under § 349, and noting that § 349 is modeled after 
section 5. of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Act (FTCA)). 
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than not, legal recourse is not a viable option to obtain 
restitution. Between fictitious agency names, call spoofing 
technology, collector aliases, and constantly changing phone 
numbers with various area codes, consumer-victims are 
fortunate just to figure out the collectors are located in New 
York—never mind locate a physical address at which to serve 
collectors.362 
In addition, because of collectors’ misrepresentations, 
consumers believe that these collectors actually are law 
enforcement officials located in their own jurisdiction.363 
Assuming a consumer-victim actually could identify and 
locate the collectors, more often than not consumer-victims 
lack the resources to travel to New York and pursue even a 
small claims action, much less hire an attorney to represent 
them in civil litigation.364 
Further limiting consumer-victims’ access to legal 
recourse, Section 349 only provides a cause of action for those 
who have suffered actual pecuniary harm.365 Harassment 
alone is insufficient for consumers to seek relief. More 
importantly, prudent consumers who do not pay are unlikely 
to even report unlawful collection attempts because they 
didn’t suffer any pecuniary harm.366 This hinders law 
enforcement because consumers who had the wherewithal to 
realize the collector’s fraudulent purpose are the ones most 
likely to retain useful information that could aid law 
 
 362. See, e.g., Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 29–35. 
 363. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127 (“call spoofing technology that 
allows your caller id to show that you’re from the town court, or a law office, or 
the judges’ office, or the police department, you know people tend to believe what 
they see and when your caller id says you’re from the police department . . .”) See 
also Pfeiffer, supra note 8. 
 364. See Chin, supra note 41, at 727–28. 
 365. Bildstein, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (holding that actual damages are a 
requisite element of § 349). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2011) (allowing the court 
to grant, “in the case of any action by an individual,” additional damages up to 
$1000). 
 366. See Bildstein, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
298 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
enforcement. 
Another issue for individual consumer-victims is that a 
legal defense exists, which provides an exception for process 
who act merely as agents of their principal—the legally 
responsible party.367 Collectors have recently stretched this 
to its logical extremes. While attorneys can overcome this 
defense without much difficulty, for private consumer-
victims who lack the time and resources to hire an attorney 
private litigation becomes even more difficult and 
expensive.368 
Even where authorities can allocate sufficient resources 
to conduct an investigation and obtain a judgment or consent 
order enjoining illegal practices and providing restitution for 
victims, this does little to actually resolve the problem. One 
reason is that judgments only affect the agency and possibly 
a few higher-up individual defendants. Such a judgment is 
entirely ineffective for enjoining individual collectors—the 
ones actually engaging in the unlawful conduct.369 
There is a disconnect here. Collectors are most successful 
when they violate the law, which reflects in their paychecks. 
Yet, they are entirely unaffected by a judgment enjoining the 
agency or their superiors from engaging in fraudulent 
acts.370 These collectors can simply move on to another 
collection agency. Civil actions, therefore, do not impact 
collectors in the slightest and, undeterred, their conduct 
 
 367. See Sykes v. Mel Harris & Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 368. See id. at 423 (explaining that the process sever exemption does not apply 
to those who go “beyond being merely being a messenger . . . and engages [sic] in 
prohibited abusive or harassing activities to force an individual to repay a debt.”). 
 369. See generally id. 
 370. Cf. NYAG Press Release, supra note 242 (discussing a lawsuit the 
Attorney General won against a debt collection agency). But see Davis Interview, 
supra note 7 (insisting that while the Attorney General won that lawsuit, the 
Buffalo Regional Office’s Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection has 
uncovered evidence indicating that many of the collectors are still working in the 
industry). 
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continues. In this way, acting alone, the NYAG’s efforts 
achieve no better results than a dog chasing its tail; 
“catching” the problem doesn’t make it go away. 
In sum, by prohibiting payday lending, New York has 
effectively protected its own citizens while simultaneously 
providing a de facto safe-harbor for collectors’ flagrantly 
fraudulent activity. On top of that, the complex, interstate 
nature of these cases present obstacles for local authorities 
attempting to enjoin illegal and deceptive practices. 
Collectors wantonly violate the law, but the violations are 
not reported to WNY officials who have jurisdiction over the 
wrongful actors. 
It then follows, assuming that state and local officials 
cannot adequately monitor, prevent, or enjoin fraudulent 
activity for various reasons, that enforcement would logically 
fall unto a federal agency.371 Once again, the uniqueness, 
infancy, and isolation of this fraudulent industry poses 
significant barriers for federal agencies. Few, if any, victims 
think to report illegal collection tactics to federal agencies 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or even the Secret 
Service—all of whom have jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes.372 Again, without receiving 
complaints, these agencies are too attenuated from the 
unlawful conduct to recognize its pervasiveness in the 
region.373 
Federal agencies’ broad jurisdiction enables them to 
investigate various criminal operations throughout the 
country, but the WNY debt collection industry presents 
 
 371. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127 (highlighting that federal 
enforcement agencies are critical in conducting debt collection investigations). 
 372. Davis Interview, supra note 7 (“who would think to call Homeland? People 
think of Homeland [Security] and they think ‘what does debt collection have to 
do with terrorism?’”). 
 373. While federal agencies (the FTC & CFPB) compile and monitor 
complaints, they do not have criminal enforcement power. See CFPB DATABASE, 
supra note 126; ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
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unique challenges that agents do not regularly encounter. 
They are entirely unfamiliar with debt collection, especially 
the operational schemes unique to WNY. While these 
agencies are great at investigating and prosecuting a wide 
variety of criminal enterprises, the complex nature of this 
industry along with the collection agencies’ efforts to conceal 
illegal practices in a shroud of legitimacy effectively inhibit 
federal agents from recognizing the illegality attending debt 
collection in the WNY region.374 
The mere conceptualization of where to start 
investigating is difficult in debt collection cases.375 Consumer 
complaints are often the only evidence at the onset of a 
case.376 While these complaints are necessary to demonstrate 
the illegal and malicious nature of collection attempts, 
consumers inadvertently throw “red herrings” into their 
complaints because they do not know what information is 
pertinent to an investigation. Conversely, other consumer 
complaints lack pertinent evidence, which is precisely why 
private individuals are rarely successful obtaining 
restitution through private litigation. 
To succeed in either a civil action or criminal charge, the 
complaining party must unravel a confusing maze of 
fictitious “company” names, phone numbers, payment 
processing accounts, and aliases.377 The process of doing so 
 
 374. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 375. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A 
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, (2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 376. See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. 
REV. 895, 896–98 (2015). 
 377. FTC v. Vantage Point Servs., LLC et al., No. 15-CV-0006-WMS-HKS, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111084, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (describing the 
amount of evidence gathered pursuant the FTC and NYAG’s motion for summary 
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business records, telephone recording transcriptions, discovery responses, and 
other evidence concerning the Defendants’ alleged unlawful debt collection 
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is not only time consuming, but also requires familiarity with 
these companies’ business structure, which is by no means 
intuitive. Another problem is that collectors are careful to not 
reveal their true identities or physical address to either 
consumers-victims or law enforcement officials.378 If they do 
provide an address, it invariably leads to a P.O. box that 
frequently is located in another state.379 If nothing else, 
collectors are at least consistent in maintaining their 
misrepresentations that they are located outside of New 
York.380 Thus, to render the representation plausible, 
collection agencies will establish mailing addresses by 
purchasing P.O. boxes in many different states.381 
Another issue is that these companies change their 
names, at least as far as the name stated to debtors, 
incredibly often.382 This makes locating them difficult. 
Moreover, the frequency with which these companies 
misrepresent their company names exacerbates difficulties 
locating their physical address, payment processing 
accounts, and phone numbers because all of these are tied to 
various fictitious or assumed company names. This can 
easily ensnare investigators attempting to untangle such a 
web. When the company is actually located, however, due to 
the frequency that these agencies “stash” corporation names, 
bank accounts, and payment information, the physical 
 
 378. See, e.g., 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 819 (noting that “[a] defendant’s 
attempt to hide his or her identity may be admissible as bearing on the 
consciousness of guilt,” which should say a lot about collectors who absolutely 
refuse to disclose their name, company name, or address). See also Davis 
Interview, supra note 7 (stating that collectors use a different name nearly every 
week). 
 379. Pls. SoMF, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 380. See, e.g., id. 
 381. See, e.g., id. at 33–34. Cf. Earls Decl., supra note 104, at 1 
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 382. See, e.g., Pls. MSJ, supra note 3, at 5–7. 
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location does not help trace the funds generated because 
collectors can move funds and switch accounts at will.383 
Finally, the structure that these agencies employ to 
effectuate their scheme helps insulate them from liability.384 
On paper, they segregate collectors’ illegal tactics from debt 
owners and the collections from the payment processor; all of 
which are working as part of a conspiracy.385 
While local WNY prosecutors lack victims to charge 
criminal collectors under New York Law,386 prosecutors 
located within victims’ jurisdiction fail to realize the extent 
of the harm caused because there are few victims within 
their jurisdiction as well. Collectors rely on this systematic 
anonymity.387 Anonymity is easily achieved when isolated 
incidents are viewed as such because the harm this scheme 
causes appears relatively small unless it is viewed 
aggregately.388 
Collectors attack vulnerable individuals and demand 
relatively small sums to avoid detection.389 Seeing only one 
or two victim complaint(s), foreign District Attorney’s offices 
cannot justify the substantial effort required to bring 
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collectors to justice for stealing only a few hundred dollars.390 
That does not even address the jurisdictional issues likely to 
arise in such a scenario, which renders victims without 
recourse should they want to press criminal charges.391 Thus, 
it falls to civil bureaus to enforce civil consumer protection 
laws despite many of the violations’ criminal nature. 
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD, WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
The interstate nature of fraudulent debt collection 
practices calls for federal criminal enforcement.392 This 
solution, however, creates a dichotomy not only between civil 
and criminal agencies but also State and Federal. The FTC 
and CFPB, both federal agencies, are the ones receiving and 
monitoring consumer complaints, yet both lack criminal 
enforcement powers.393 None of the federal agencies with 
criminal enforcement powers, such as the FBI or DHS, 
monitor consumer complaints. This leaves them in the dark 
regarding pervasive criminal conduct necessitating 
investigation. Moreover, all of these federal agencies lack 
sufficient familiarity with the issues unique to the WNY 
region. 
Conversely, local or state agencies with this familiarity 
lack adequate resources and a sufficient number of victims 
to justify a lengthy, criminal investigation.394 Readily 
apparent is the need for multi-agency cooperation and 
communication before law enforcement can combat the 
region’s ongoing criminal conduct. Without multi-agency 
cooperation or allocating sufficient resources for 
 
 390. See generally id. 
 391. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 392. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 393. See, e.g., CFPB DATABASE, supra note 126. See generally, Littwin, supra 
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investigations, illegal practices will continue undeterred; 
“it’s like playing ‘whack-a-mole,’” when one goes down, two 
more spring up.395 
Joint investigations are the way forward if enforcement 
agencies are serious about eliminating, or at least greatly 
reducing, illegal collection tactics. But even multi-agency 
cooperation presents new obstacles for law enforcement 
officials. 
The first is the distinction between criminal and civil 
enforcement agencies or bureaus. Civil agencies operate 
under different rules than their criminal counterparts. For 
example, while the NYAG has the power to issue subpoenas 
in both civil and criminal matter, only its criminal divisions 
are empowered to obtain search and seizure warrants.396 
Similarly, state and federal agencies also operate under 
different standards. When involved in a joint investigation, 
both state and federal agencies must proceed carefully to 
verify that they  permissibly disseminate evidence uncovered 
with each other to ensure that shared materials are not 
tainted as evidence. 
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), for 
example, “prohibits the use in evidence of any intercepted 
communications or evidence derived therefrom if the 
disclosure of such information would be in violation of the 
wiretap statute.”397 When enacted, Congress intended to 
protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.398 These 
 
 395. ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127. 
 396. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(8) (empowering the Attorney-General’s office to 
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also, e.g., Hynes v Moskowitz, 377 N.E.2d 446, 449 (1978). 
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 398. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(11), 2518(10)(a). 
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legislators could not possibly have foreseen technological 
developments rendering OCCA protections much broader 
than originally intended. For the purposes of the OCCA, 
Congress’ defined “wire communication” as: 
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of 
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, 
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the 
point of reception . . . furnished or operated by any person engaged 
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of in-
terstate or foreign communications or communications affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce.399 
Currently, this broad definition applies to any data 
stored in cyberspace—including nearly all data stored in “the 
cloud.” Anything that could even remotely be construed as a 
“communication” meets this definition. Collection software 
electronically preserves collectors’ notes entered in debtors’ 
accounts. Because other collectors can see each other’s notes 
in the software, courts could reasonably conclude that these 
notes are “communications” within the OCCA’s definition.400 
Thus, criminal agencies, even with a valid warrant, could 
potentially taint any evidence shared with any civil agencies 
working in conjunction with them. 
The good news is that enforcement agencies at the local, 
state, and federal levels have all begun to realize the need 
for remedial action.401 Collectors’ pervasive illegal conduct is 
slowly gaining more attention from local police as well as 
agencies such as the NYAG, FTC, CFPB, DHS, and FBI. 
These agencies are realizing both the necessity and utility of 
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joint investigations.402 Unfortunately, such realizations 
needed to come earlier when illegal practices had yet to 
permeate the vast majority of WNY collection agencies. 
To date, prosecutors have only obtained a few criminal 
convictions against Buffalo-based debt collectors; the 
convictions being for criminal offenses such as wire fraud or 
aggravated identity theft.403 This is a step in the right 
direction, but criminal prosecution cannot stop at a few 
convictions if authorities want to remediate the widespread 
illegality occurring in the industry. Nor can officials charge 
only those in supervisory roles, such as agency’ managers 
and owners, while allowing the collectors actually making 
calls to escape unscathed. Proceeding in this manner only 
pushes these collectors to move on to another agency, where 
they introduce and perpetuate the illegal tactics to which 
they are accustomed.404 
Across WNY, the universal theme is that illegal 
collections all revolve around a “scheme or artifice to 
defraud.”405 The managers and owners are typically the ones 
held accountable for devising such a scheme or artifice, but 
that does not excuse individual collectors from intentionally 
perpetrating one or more specific fraudulent acts within the 
scheme, including mail-fraud,406 wire-fraud,407 health-care 
fraud,408 government benefit fraud,409 aggravated identity 
 
 402. See ASAC Sibley Interview, supra note 127; Vaughters, supra note 43. 
 403. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 51; Phil Fairbanks, Buffalo Debt 
Collectors Accused of Taking in ‘Tens of Millions’ by Harassing Consumers, BUFF. 
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2016, https://buffalonews.com/2016/11/02/buffalo-debt-collector-
accused-harassing-consumers/; Fairbanks, supra note 1. 
 404. See supra note 194–197 and accompanying text. 
 405. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2017) (defining a “scheme or artifice to defraud”). 
 406. See §§ 1037, 1341 (criminalizing both mail fraud and electronic mail 
fraud). 
 407. See § 1343. 
 408. See § 1347. 
 409. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 608–609 (2017) (defining public assistance fraud and the 
penalties for violations). 
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theft,410 tax evasion,411 and/or money laundering.412 Given 
collectors’ apparent desire to perpetrate any and every kind 
of fraud, law enforcement officials ought to respond 
accordingly by prosecuting each and every culpable 
participant.413 
Criminally prosecuting lower level employees who 
intentionally commit criminal acts would demonstrate that 
such acts will no longer go unpunished. Simply being a point-
caller, for example, who did not devise the scheme, should 
not exonerate an individual from culpable participation in 
such a fraudulent scheme. Additionally, with smaller 
operations the NYAG and local District Attorneys’ offices 
ought to assume the responsibility for bringing criminal 
charges against collectors under New York law.414 
New York should also require licensing for agencies 
regularly involved in debt brokering or collecting. Ideally, 
licensing requirements would allow law enforcement to 
monitor collection agencies, their tactics, and employees.415 
Registration and licensing requirements, if implemented 
 
 410. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. 
 411. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq. (criminalizing specific acts relating to tax 
evasion). 
 412. See 31 U.S.C. § 5342 (2017). 
 413. Collectors in WNY are apparently very familiar with the criminal justice 
system—they do represent themselves as lawyers after all—so defending a “two-
part federal criminal complaint,” just like one that they threatened victims with, 
shouldn’t burden them much at all, right? But see Fairbanks, supra note 1 
(describing Alan Ceccarelli’s 78-month federal prison sentence for engaging in 
abusive and unlawful collections, which seems ironically similar to the threats 
he made against victims of his collection scheme). 
 414. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.25, 190.26, 190.50, & 190.60; N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW §600 et seq. (providing that violating New York collection laws, which are 
nearly identical to the FDCPA, amounts to a misdemeanor offense). 
 415. Employees misstate their position as “customer service representatives” 
or “telemarketers,” which allows them to maintain employment in a position they 
should not be in. Registration could potentially preclude many ex-convicts from 
having access to skip-tracing software. Likewise, this could make it much more 
difficult for collectors to defraud public assistance programs. See Davis Interview, 
supra note 7. 
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correctly, would also require collection agencies to disclose 
their physical operating location. Likewise, licensing should 
also require collectors to disclose all active phone lines, and 
notify the state regulating agency within forty-eight hours of 
any changes. However, there are two shortcomings 
accompanying registration and/or licensing requirements for 
debt collection agencies. First, implementing such a system 
is potentially costly. Second, even with a licensing or 
registration process in place, the registry alone is useless 
without adequate oversight.416 
Further legislative action could aid law enforcement 
officials in investigating illicit debt collection operations. 
Both Congress and New York’s legislature ought to amend, 
repeal, or clarify outdated statutes—such as the OCCA for 
example. On the other hand, while many legal scholars argue 
stronger legislation is necessary to remediate certain high-
interest lending,417 this type of legislation alone is 
insufficient. 
Between the FDCPA and various state laws regulating 
predatory lending practices, ineffective consumer protection 
laws are not the problem. The protections currently in place 
provide adequate protection—it is the enforcement of these 
protections that is lacking.418 New legislation would not 
address the current limitations authorities face when 
attempting to eradicate fraudulent practices. Likewise, 
tribal nations, generally, are the most notorious predatory 
payday lenders. But, because they can assert a sovereign 
 
 416. Mary Spector, Taming The Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and 
Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 996 (2008) (concluding that 
“[s]ustained enforcement by state and federal agencies is a critical element in 
effectively monitoring compliance” regarding high interest borrowing such as 
payday loans). 
 417. See, e.g., Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 
81 Fed. Reg. 47864–01 (proposed July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1041). 
 418. See Spector, supra note 416, at 995–96 (outlining proposed regulations 
aimed at “taming the beast” that is the payday lending industry, but conceding 
that “voluntary compliance by payday lenders could not be expected”). 
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immunity defense, effectually precluding legislation from 
remediating the evils at which it is directed, further lending 
regulations would prove ineffective.419 
As opposed to legislating new regulations, simply 
promulgating information to educate the public about 
current collection laws, such as the FDCPA, would prove 
cheaper and easier, while presumably achieving similar 
results.420 The public needs more education so people realize 
that defaulting on a private debt is not a criminal offense; 
people need to know that neither they nor their loved ones 
can be arrested or imprisoned for non-payment of these 
debts. This would strip collectors of their intimidating tactics 
on which they rely to perpetrate their fraudulent scheme. 
That is not to say that legitimate debtors should not be held 
responsible for valid contractual obligations, but government 
officials must find a more effective remedy to strike a balance 
between debtors’ and creditors’ rights to offset predatory 
collection attempts. 
Finally, should all other solutions prove unsuccessful, 
one drastic option remains. Law enforcement could charge 
everyone involved in an illegal collection scheme under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), which, ironically, Congress passed as part of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.421 RICO confers upon 
 
 419. See Adam Mayle, Usury On the Reservation: Regulation of Tribal-
Affiliated Payday Lenders, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1053, 1058–72 (2012) 
(highlighting different states’ and agencies attempts to regulate payday lending 
against tribal-affiliated payday lenders, and noting that “[t]his broad conception 
of tribal immunity has permitted tribal groups to pursue a wide range of 
commercial activities that are beyond effective regulation, including payday 
lending”). 
 420. Cf. Lisa Lake, Stand up to Fake Debt Collectors, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: 
CONSUMER INFO. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/stand-fake-
debt-collectors. 
 421. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2017) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who has 
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt . . .”); Unencumbered Assets, 
Tr. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.), 617 F. Supp. 
2d 700, 711 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that “[w]hile it is true that ‘jurisdiction over 
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law enforcement the ability to criminally charge and 
prosecute all individuals involved in a particular criminal 
enterprise or racketeering conspiracy.422 Albeit drastic, 
charging everyone from the lowest-level collectors to the 
ringleaders would send a loud and clear message to others 
employed in the industry that this behavior will not be 
tolerated. 
Moreover, if low-level collectors realize their liberty is in 
jeopardy, it is unlikely that they would continue to protect 
their superiors, who reap enormous financial benefits, while 
collectors receive only modest wages.423 Collectors, on 
average, are not sufficiently well-compensated to justify 
taking the fall for their superiors. Therefore, if going after 
collection agency employees in supervisory roles continues to 
fall short of venerating consumer protection laws, utilizing 
RICO, presumably, would foster collectors proffering and 
becoming informants for law enforcement. Informants 
coming forward would allow law enforcement to work their 
way up chain to those orchestrating or facilitating unlawful 
acts. 
From the shadows, Western New York’s unregulated and 
uninhibited debt collection industry has terrorized 
Americans across the country. The anonymity now possible 
through modern technology has shrouded the lawless nature 
of collections and its pervasiveness in the WNY region. This, 
in turn, fostered the “Wild West” atmosphere observable 
today. Such unencumbered illegality presents a daunting 
 
the individual officers of a corporation cannot be predicated merely upon 
jurisdiction over the corporation’ . . . the mere fact that the actions connecting 
defendants to the state were undertaken in an official rather than personal 
capacity does not preclude the exercise of personal jurisdiction over those 
defendants.”). This indicates that directors are subject to personal liability under 
RICO for the corporation’s activities within a foreign state; the “corporate veil” 
provides no protection if a common conspiracy is established. 
 422. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962 (2017) (defining prohibited acts and available 
remedies). 
 423. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (providing that “Ciffa had a 
total income of $1,284,951.04.”). 
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task for law enforcement to effectively reign in these ongoing, 
pervasive, and unlawful practices. Law enforcement has a 
duty to undertake this task, for illegal tactics have far-
exceeded any bounds of reasonableness. While the first step 
is to bring these illegal practices out from the shadows, this 
alone is not enough. Taming WNY’s debt collection industry 
will require the cooperation of law enforcement officials at 
every level—local, state, and federal. Working jointly fosters 
information sharing and allows each agency to utilize their 
own unique powers, expertise, and resources. The 
effectiveness of these solutions depends entirely on law 
enforcement’s diligence and commitment to achieving results 
because, working alone, no agency can effectively tame New 
York’s west. 
